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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a) Statement Of The Case 
On January 19, 2012, shortly after being sworn in as the Mayor of Sun Valley, DeWayne 
Briscoe ("Defendant Briscoe" and the "Briscoe Administration") 1 terminated Appellant Sharon 
R. Hammer ("Ms. Hammer") as the Sun Valley City Administrator. The basis of this law suit is 
that Ms. Hammer suffered through unwarranted disciplinary investigations, her termination, and 
a fraudulent and unsuccessful attempt by Briscoe Administration officials to coerce the Blaine 
County Prosecutor into filing criminal charges against Ms. Hammer, in retaliation for numerous 
harassment claims she had made against former Sun Valley City Council member Nils Ribi 
("Defendant Ribi")2, Defendant Briscoe's political ally, in violation of the Idaho Protection Of 
Public Employees Act (Idaho Statute 6-2101 et seq.) (the "IPPEA") (Exhibit D herein). Ms. 
Hammer, however, never got to present her case to a jury because summary judgment was 
entered against her by the District Court, unrelated to her legitimate IPPEA claims. 
Waiver: On January 23, 2012, in return for payment of "severance" described in her City 
Administrator Employment Agreement (the "Employment Agreement") (Rec. 1023-1028, 
1 Defendant Briscoe served as a member of the Sun Valley City Council from January of 2008 to January of 20 I 0, 
and as the President of the Sun Valley City Council from January of 20 IO to January of 2012. Defendant Briscoe has 
served as the Mayor of Sun Valley from January of 2012 to current, but chose not to run for re-election in November 
of 2015. Defendant Briscoe' s tenure as Mayor of Sun Valley ends ( ended) the first week of January of 2016. 
2 Defendant Ribi chose not to run for re-election to the Sun Valley City Council in November of 2013 after 
Defendant Ribi's abusive conduct towards Ms. Hammer was made public. 
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Exhibit herein), Ms. Hammer supplied Sun Valley a Supplemental Release (Supp.Rec. 79, 
Exhibit B herein) which reserved Ms. Hammer's rights to bring causes of action not intended to 
be prospectively waived when she signed the Employment Agreement in 2008, including IPPEA 
claims. The Supplemental Release did not waive "all claims" as had been demanded by Sun 
Valley officials, nor does it even mention the IPPEA. Without seeking any further modifications 
to the Supplemental Release, Briscoe Administration officials voluntarily paid Ms. Hammer the 
"severance" anyway. Even though the Supplemental Release does not actually state so, the 
Briscoe Administration has subsequently claimed that Ms. Hammer, none the less, waived "all 
claims", including IPPEA claims, and convinced the District Court of that claim. Ms. Hammer 
appeals that decision based on several factual and legal arguments, and requests this Court to 
instead enter summary judgment in Ms. Hammer's favor that she did not waive IPPEA claims. 
Post Termination Adverse Actions: Subsequent to her termination, and after the 
submission of the Supplemental Release, Briscoe Administration officials continued their 
retaliatory conduct against Ms. Hammer by seeking a fraudulent criminal investigation of Ms. 
Hammer, commencing a forensic audit related to Ms. Hammer's conduct, and issuing numerous 
public statements and press releases publicly denigrating Ms. Hammer. Almost a year after Ms. 
Hammer's termination, the Blaine County Prosecutor finally put an end to the public criminal 
allegations against Ms. Hammer by issuing a letter exonerating Ms. Hammer of any possible 
criminal conduct (Rec. 430-434)3, because Defendant Ribi and Defendant Briscoe themselves 
3 Only the first five (5) pages of the Blaine County Prosecutor's letter of November 21, 2012 were included by Ms. 
Hammer in the Record On Appeal as the remainder of the letter applies to other Sun Valley employees (against 
whom false criminal allegations had also been made by Sun Valley officials) and matters unrelated to Ms. Hammer. 
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had approved the same conduct that was asserted to be criminal. Ms. Hammer asserts that the 
post-termination conduct of the Briscoe Administration is actionable under the IPPEA, even if 
Ms. Hammer was found to have waived her claims to pre-termination relief under the IPPEA. 
Judicial Estoppel: The District Court also entered summary judgment finding that Ms. 
Hammer was judicially estopped from asserting that Sun Valley's termination of Ms. Hammer 
"without cause" (i.e. at will) under provisions of the Employment Agreement was a pretext for 
the numerous real reasons that Ms. Hammer was actually terminated, including in retaliation for 
making harassment claims against Defendant Ribi. The judicial estoppel findings were made by 
the District Court sua ~ponte. Ms. Hammer seeks that the judicial estoppel findings be reversed. 
Individual Liability Under The IPPEA: The District Court also found that neither 
Defendant Briscoe nor Defendant Ribi could be held personally liable under the IPPEA. Ms. 
Hammer seeks the Court's determination that the language of the IPPEA and the legislative 
history of the IPPEA provides for individual liability for municipal officials. As neither 
Defendant Briscoe nor Defendant Ribi were specifically named in the Supplemental Release, 
neither are entitled to claim that Ms. Hammer waived claims against either, individually. 
Work Product Privileges: Prior to her termination, Ms. Hammer was subjected to a 
retaliatory disciplinary investigation, commenced by Sun Valley at the urgings of Defendant Ribi 
and Defendant Briscoe, performed by investigator Patricia Latham-Ball ("Investigator Ball" and 
the "Ball Investigation"), during the last ten (10) weeks of former Sun Valley Mayor Wayne 
7 
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Willich's (''Former Mayor Willich" and the Willich Administration")4 tenure (i.e. November 9, 
2011 to January 3, 2012 - the "Post Election Period")5. The District Court granted broad work 
product protections to all communications related to the Ball Investigation, even though the 
report(s) produced by Investigator Ball were published in toto in the Idaho Mountain Express 
and extensively quoted from in the Boise Weekly. and several Sun Valley officials openly 
discussed the Ball Investigation and the various reports issued by Investigator Ball in their 
depositions. Ms. Hammer appeals the work product protection findings. 
Attorney-Client Privileges: While still employed with Sun Valley, Ms. Hammer filed a 
retaliation law suit against Defendant Ribi and Sun Valley under the IPPEA (the "Original 
IPPEA Law Suit")6 and a federal harassment, retaliation and discrimination complaint against 
Defendant Ribi and Sun Valley7 (the "Federal Law Suit"). Attorney Kirtlan Naylor ("Attorney 
Naylor") was assigned to defend against those claims by Sun Valley's insurance company 
("ICRMP"). Attorney Naylor's limited role as ICRMP's assigned counsel was to defend against 
Ms. Hammer's law suits. Attorney Naylor obtained no written retainer agreement or other 
4 Former Mayor Willich served as Mayor of Sun Valley from January of 2008 to January of 2012. Former Mayor 
Willich lost the November of 2011 municipal election for Sun Valley Mayor to Defendant Briscoe by about 24 
votes. Defendant Ribi endorsed Defendant Briscoe over Former Mayor Willich in the November of 2011 election. 
5 As will be further detailed, at the end of the Ball Investigation, Former Mayor Willich exonerated Ms. Hammer of 
any misconduct because everything she had been accused of had been approved by either Former Mayor Willich or 
the Sun Valley City Council. Even though Former Mayor Willich's exoneration of Ms. Hammer was "final and 
binding" pursuant to Section 8.7 of the Sun Valley Personnel Policies (Rec. 174-175). the Briscoe Administration 
ignored Former Mayor Willich's findings and re-investigated Ms. Hammer for the same misconduct allegations. 
6 On November 21, 2011, Ms. Hammer filed a Complaint in Hammer v. Ribi, Sun Valley, et al., CV-2011-928 
(Blaine County) asserting that Sun Valley's commencing the Ball Investigation and placing her on administrative 
leave was in retaliation for her harassment complaints against Defendant Ribi, in violation of the IPPEA. The 
Original IPPEA Law Suit was voluntarily dismissed with leave to reinstate on January 11, 2012. 
7 In mid-December of 2011, Ms. Hammer filed a harassment, retaliation, and discrimination Complaint against 
Defendant Ribi and Sun Valley with the Idaho Human Rights Commission ("IHRC") (Case. No. E-0112-241; 38C-
2012-00122). After the release of "right to sue'' letters by the IHRC and EEOC in 2013, Ms. Hammer filed a federal 
Complaint for harassment and retaliation in Hammer v. Sun Valley, et al., i: i 3-cv-0021 i-EjL (U.S. Idaho). 
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official direction expanding that limited authority. Yet, the District Court retroactively granted 
Attorney Naylor broad attorney-client privileges for all Sun Valley related matters during the 
Willich Administration. Ms. Hammer asserts that it was error to grant Attorney Naylor any 
attorney-client privileges related to the Ball Investigation, which was commenced before any 
litigation was commenced and before Attorney Naylor was appointed by ICRMP, and for which 
Attorney Naylor obtained no authority to participate. Further, the Court will be required to 
determine whether Attorney Naylor possessed a legitimate attorney-client relationship with Sun 
Valley at all (as opposed to with Defendant Ribi) during the Post Election Period, considering 
the conflict between Attorney Naylor' s representation of Defendant Ribi and Sun Valley in the 
Original IPPEA Law Suit and the Federal Law Suit at the same time (without obtaining written 
consent from all co-defendants as is required by I.R.P. C. I. 7(b )( 4 )), and Former Mayor Willich' s 
rejection of Attorney Naylor as Sun Valley's attorney during the Post Election Period because of 
those conflicts8• Finally, the Court must not only consider the extent of authority granted to 
Attorney Naylor by Sun Valley, but also the nature of Attorney Naylor's actions. To the extent 
Attorney Naylor participated in Defendant Ribi's and Defendant Briscoe's retaliatory conduct 
and false criminal accusations against Ms. Hammer, his actions fall outside the scope of privilege 
under J.R.E. 501 (d)(I) (i.e. the crime fraud exception). 
8 See Willich Compel Aff., Para. 61, Rec. 307, where Former Mayor Willich states: "I certify that from the moment 
he was appointed by ICRMP as defense counsel in regards to the [Original IPPEA Law Suit], I considered Attorney 
Naylor to have acted in contradiction to my directions and authority and to the best interest of Sun Valley, in favor 
of his defense of Council Member Ribi and ICRMP, and therefore I never considered or recognized Attorney Naylor 
to have been either Sun Valley's attorney or my personal attorney." 
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(ii) Course Of The Proceedings 
Ms. Hammer filed her Complaint on June 9, 2012 (Rec. 14-99) and her Amended 
Complaint on December 27, 2012 (Rec. 100-186). On November 26, 2013, the District Court 
entered its Order dismissing Defendant Ribi and Defendant Briscoe (Rec. 567-575), and on 
February 18, 2014 the District Court entered its Order denying reconsideration of its dismissal of 
Defendant Ribi and Defendant Briscoe (Rec. 793-795). On January 17, 2014, the District Court 
entered its Order denying Ms. Hammer's Motion To Compel discovery related to the Ball 
Investigation (Supp.Rec. 15-25), and on May 16, 2014 the District Court entered its Order 
denying reconsideration of that ruling (Rec. 809-818). On January 12, 2015, the District Court 
entered its Summary Judgment Order (Rec. 1507-1517) granting Sun Valley summary judgment, 
and on June 8, 2015 the District Court entered its Order denying reconsideration of its entry of 
summary judgment in Sun Valley's favor (Supp.Rec. 220). 
(iii) Statement Of Facts 
The Employment Agreement 
The 2008 Employment Agreement (Rec.1023-1028) (Exhibit A herein) was prepared by 
then Sun Valley City Attorney Rand Peebles. The Employment Agreement included a provision 
(Section 3.A. of the Employment Agreement) (the "Severance Clause") that required that if Ms. 
Hammer was ever terminated "without cause", she would be entitled to "severance" of six (6) 
months of pay, but was required to provide a release to obtain the "severance". A sample of the 
release was not attached to the Employment Agreement, nor was specific language of what was 
supposed to be included in a release included in the Employment Agreement. 
IO 
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When the Employment Agreement was entered into, Ms. Hammer9 and Former Mayor 
Willich 10 agreed that Ms. Hammer would not be required to waive any statutory claims, such as 
IPPEA claims, unrelated to salary or other benefits, if she was ever terminated by Sun Valley 
"without cause" and paid the "severance" described in the Employment Agreement. 
The Legitimate Harassment Claims Of Ms. Hammer Against Defendant Ribi 
For three year, Ms. Hammer was subjected to ever more hostile harassment and abuse 
from Defendant Ribi 11 , including that Defendant Ribi assaulted Ms. Hammer in Sun Valley City 
Hall in September of 2011 12 • The harassment was reported to numerous Sun Valley officials. 
The gender based nature of the harassment of Ms. Hammer by Defendant Ribi was 
confirmed by Former Mayor Willich 13 and former Sun Valley City Council member Joan 
Lamb 14 ("Former Council Member Lamb") 15 • Section 7.5 of the Sun Valley Personnel Policies 
(Amended Complaint, Rec. 168-170) (the "Sun Valley Anti-Harassment Policy") prohibits 
"harassment in any form (emphasis added)" and applies to Sun Valley City Council members. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "harassment" as "Repeated conduct that is not wanted and is 
known to all parties as offensive", which describes Defendant Ribi's incessant, unwanted and 
hostile conduct towards Ms. Hammer. Former Mayor Willich, a 30 year Boeing Co. executive, 
9 Hammer Aff., Para. 3-11, Rec. 1016-1020; Hammer Recon. Aff., Para. 6-12, Supp.Rec. 84-92. 
10 Willich IHRC AfL Para. 4. Rec. 661-672; Willich Aff., Para. 3-9, Rec. I 042-1044; and Willich Recon. Aff., Para. 
4-11, Supp.Rec. 113-117. 
11 Amended Complaint, Para. 43-119, Rec. 106-122. 
12 Amended Complaint, Para. 120-128, Rec. 122-124. 
13 Willich IHRC Aff., Para. 13, Rec. 663-668: Willich Compel Atl, Para. 11, Rec. 294-297; Willich Dep .• Rec. 
1178-1179, 1204. 
14 Lamb Dep., Rec. 1362. 
15 Former Council Member Lamb served as a Sun Valley City Council member from January of 2008 through 
January of 2012. 
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confirmed Defendant Ribi's harassment of Ms. Hammer16 and stated "It's inappropriate, and it 
was harassment ... I know what harassment looks like." 17 . Even Defendant Briscoe admitted 
that, while he was the President of the Sun Valley City Council, he was aware of the harassment 
complaints against Defendant Ribi back to early 2011, but did nothing about it because it was not 
"my responsibility or authority to do so under the statutes or otherwise." 18 However, Sun Valley 
City Attorney Adam King ("City Attorney King") advised that there was nothing that could be 
done to Defendant Ribi because he was an elected official 19• 
On numerous occasions Former Mayor Willich confronted Defendant Ribi and told him 
to cease his harassment of Ms. Hammer20. Defendant Ribi's response to those demands was, 
basically, "screw you"21 . Defendant Ribi feigned any knowledge that Ms. Hammer had 
previously made any harassment complaints against him22 . However, Former Mayor Willich 
specifically gave Defendant Ribi the Sun Valley Anti-Harassment Policy in September of 2010 
because of the complaints made by Ms. Hammer23. Considering that Former Mayor Willich, 
Defendant Briscoe, Former Council Member Lamb, the Sun Valley Police Chief and City 
Attorney King were all aware of Ms. Hammer's harassment complaints against Defendant Ribi, 
it is inconceivable that Defendant Ribi himself was not aware of the harassment complaints 
16 Willich Dep., Pg. 135, Line 20-21, Rec. 1204. 
17 Willich Dep., Pg. 136, Line 2-3, Line 9, Rec. 1204. 
18 Briscoe, Dep., Pg. 61, Line 8-9, Rec. 1233. 
19 Willich IHRC Aff., Para. 13. Rec. 663-668; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 11, Rec. 294-297; Willich Dep., Rec. 
1205-1207. 
20 Willich IHRC Aff., Para. 8, 10, 14, Rec. 663-668; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 8, 10, 12, 77, Rec. 294-297, 311; 
WillichDep.,Rec.1178-1179, 1190-1191, 1205. 
21 Willich Dep., Pg. 139 Line 8-25 to Pg. I 40, Line I, Rec. 1205. 
22 Ribi Orig. IPPEA TRO Aff., Para. 5, 12, Rec. 1124-1125; Ribi Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 7, Rec. 608; Ribi Dep., 
Rec. 1269. 
23 Willich Dep., Rec. l 190-1191; Ribi Dep., Rec. 1270. 
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against him, whether he acknowledged his misconduct or not. 
Ms. Hammer's Legitimate Use Of Compensatory Time And A Sun Valley Auto 
The false misconduct allegations against Ms. Hammer, first raised by Defendant Ribi 
immediately after Defendant Briscoe defeated Former Mayor Willich in the November of 2011 
municipal election, which commenced the Ball Investigation, and subjected Ms. Hammer to false 
criminal allegations, related to her taking of compensatory time and using a Sun Valley auto. 
The Sun Valley Personnel Policies specifically provides for compensatory time24, 
including, Section 4.8.B of the Sun Valley Personnel Policies25 which describes that because 
"exempt" employees (such as Ms. Hammer) were not entitled to overtime, they were allowed 
flexible schedules from "week to week". In addition, Section 10.A of the Employment 
Agreement26 allowed Former Mayor Willich to provide Ms. Hammer with benefits in excess of 
the benefits provided to other Sun Valley employees, including authorizing her to take 
compensatory time, which he confirmed he had27. Former Council Member Lamb confirmed that 
the entire Sun Valley City Council was aware of, and authorized, Ms. Hammer to use 
compensatory time, as she used it28 . 
As to the Sun Valley auto, pursuant to Section 1 O.A of the Employment Agreement (Rec. 
1023-1028, Exhibit A herein), Former Mayor Willich was authorized to provide Ms. Hammer 
24 See Sections 1.2, 2.1, 3.9, 3.11, 4.8 and 5.1 of the Sun Valley Personnel Policies (Rec. 137-186). In at least four 
places the Sun Valley Personnel Policies uses the phrase "compensatory time" (see Section 4.8 and 5.1 of the Sun 
Valley Personnel Policies). (Rec. 160-161 ). 
25 Rec. 160. 
26 Rec. I 023-1028, Exhibit A herein. 
27 Willich Dep., Rec. 199-1201 and Willich Compel Aff., Para. 59, Rec. 307. 
28 Lamb Dep., Pg. 30, Line 18 to Pg. 31, Line 13 and Pg. 41, Line 20-23, Rec. i 366. 
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with the use of the Sun Valley auto, including for personal purposes, even if other Sun Valley 
employees were not allowed such use29, which he confirmed he had30. Former Council Member 
Lamb also confirmed that the entire Sun Valley City Council was aware of, and authorized, Ms. 
Hammer to use the Sun Valley auto, including for personal purposes, twenty-four (24) hours a 
day, during Ms. Hammer's entire tenure as the Sun Valley City Administrator31 • 
The Retaliatory Misconduct Allegations Against Ms. Hammer, The Ball Investigation, The 
Exoneration Of Ms. Hammer By Former Mayor Willich, And The Post Election Conduct Of Sun 
Valley Officials 
At a November 11, 2011 closed door Sun Valley City Council executive session, three 
(3) days after Defendant Briscoe defeated Former Mayor Willich in the Sun Valley mayoral 
election, Defendant Ribi accused Ms. Hammer of numerous acts of misconduct, including 
"criminal" and "illegal" misconduct32 . Defendant Ribi and Defendant Briscoe then demanded 
M H , . . . . 3, M H f d . 34 s. ammer s termmat1on or res1gnat1on· ·. s. ammer re use to resign· . 
Former Council Member Lamb confirmed that there was no need to investigate Ms. 
Hammer for what she had been formally authorized to do, but that Defendant Ribi and Defendant 
Briscoe had only one "agenda", which was to find any reason to terminate Ms. Hammer35 . 
On November 14, 2011, the Sun Valley City Council passed a resolution ordering Former 
29 It should be noted that Ms. Hammer was not just the Sun Valley City Administrator, but was a Sun Valley on-call 
fire fighter and EMT, and used the Sun Valley auto to respond to those calls. 
30 Willich Dep. Rec. 1175, 1197-1198 and Willich Compel Aff. Para. 59, Rec. 307. 
31 Lamb Dep., Pg. 30, Line 18 to Pg. 31 Line 13, Pg. 41, Line 20-23, and Pg. 63, Line 7-9, Rec. 1364, 1366, 1372. 
32 Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 3, Rec. 673-675,Willich Dep., Rec. 1176-1178; Briscoe Dep., Rec. 1250; Ribi 
Dep., Rec. 1284, 1295-1302; Lamb Dep., Rec. 1361. 
33 Willich Compel Aff., Para. 14, Rec. 297-298; Willich Dep., Rec. 1176-1178, Lamb Dep., Rec. 1365, 1371. 
34 Amended Complaint, Para. 135, Rec. 126. 
35 Lamb Dep., Pg. 30, Line 18 to Pg. 31, Line 13, Rec. 1364; Lamb Dep., Pg. 37-38, Rec i365-1366. 
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Mayor Willich to engage an investigator and to commence the Ball Investigation36. Former 
Mayor Willich thereafter hired Investigator Ball to perform a "fact finding" "independent 
disciplinary investigation", solely looking into "violations of Sun Valley policy"37. Investigator 
Ball was to report solely to Former Mayor Willich38. 
On November 18, 2011, Ms. Hammer was placed on administrative leave39. On 
November 21, 2011, in response to being subject to the Ball Investigation and being placed on 
administrative leave, Ms. Hammer filed the Original IPPEA Law Suit40. Immediately after the 
filing of the Original IPPEA Law Suit, Defendant Ribi (through his initial private counsel Keith 
Roark) filed an Affidavit in the Original IPPEA Law Suit accusing Ms. Hammer of unspecified 
"illegal" and "criminal" acts, of "falsification of public records", and of "misuse of public funds 
and equipment"41 . The accusations were extensively quoted in the Idaho Mountain Express. 
In response to Ms. Hammer filing the Original IPPEA Law Suit, Attorney Naylor was 
appointed by ICRMP to defend Sun Valley, Defendant Ribi and City Attorney King42 in the 
Original IPPEA Law Suit43. City Attorney King was then directed to have nothing to do with the 
36 Rec. 732-734. 
37 Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff .• Para. 10-11, Rec. 675-677; Willich Ribi/Donoval Supp. Aff., Para. 16, Rec. 540; 
Willich Compel Aff., Para. 18-22, 95; Rec. 298-299, 316; Willich Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 12, Rec. 773; Willich 
Dep., Rec. 1180-1185; Briscoe Dep., Rec. 1234-1235; Ribi Dep., Rec. 1288; Youngman Dep., Rec. 1325-1326. 
1336; Lamb Dep., Rec. 1363. 1368; Rec. 323-324; Ball Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 6, Rec. 628. 
38 Willich IHRC Aff., Para. 15, Rec. 668; Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 12, Rec. 675-677; Willich Compel Aff., 
Para. 20, 23, Rec. 298-299; Willich Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 14, Rec. 773; Willich Dep., Rec. 1180-1185, 1208. 
39 Rec. 557; Hammer Orig. IPPEA TRO Aff., Para. 3, Rec. 553; King Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 13, Rec. 613. 
40 Willich IHRC Aff., Para. 15, Rec. 669; Donoval Ribi/Donoval SJ Aff., Para. 12, Rec. 705-706; Donoval Compel 
Aff., Para. 2. Rec. 370. 
41 Rec.1123-1127. 
42 City Attorney King was named as a defendant in the Original IPPEA Law Suit because of his conduct in actively 
seeking Ms. Hammer's termination during the Post Election Period. City Attorney King is not a defendant herein 
43 Willich IHRC Aff., Para. 15, Rec. 669; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 25, Rec. 300; Willich Dep., Rec. 1181-1183; 
Naylor Aff., Para. 2, Rec. 602-606; King Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 17, Rec. 614. 
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Investigation44 . Ms. Hammer's counsel ("Mr. Donoval"45), requested written confirmation 
as to Attorney Naylor's authority in regards to the Ball Investigation, but was not responded to 46. 
Although he held initial discussions with Attorney Naylor, Former Mayor Willich 
concluded that Attorney Naylor had a conflict of interest in representing both Sun Valley and 
Defendant Ribi in the Original IPPEA Law Suit47 . Former Mayor Willich demanded that ICMRP 
assign Sun Valley a separate attorney, but was told by ICRMP personnel and Attorney Naylor 
that he had no choice in the matter48 . Attorney Naylor told Former Mayor Willich that Attorney 
Naylor worked for ICRMP, not Sun Valley49. 
Attorney Naylor never entered into a written retainer agreement with Sun Valley during 
the Willich Administration. Former Mayor Willich has asserted that Attorney Naylor did so, 
fraudulently, to later assert he had greater authority than he was ever granted50. Attorney Naylor 
appeared in the Original IPPEA Law Suit on behalf of both Sun Valley and Defendant Ribi 
without obtaining written confirmation from both, in violation of I.R.P. C. 1. 7(b )( 4 ), and failed to 
communicate with Former Mayor Willich in regards to pleadings or matters in the Original 
IPPEA Law Suit during the remainder of the Willich Administration, violating I.R.P. C. 1.451 • 
Former Mayor Willich advised Attorney Naylor he was not to have anything to do with 
44 Willich Supp.Comp. Aff., Para. 11, Rec. 771-772; King Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 15, Rec. 614. 
45 Mr. Donoval is also Ms Hammer·s husband. 
46 Rec. 379-381; Donoval Compel Aff., Para. 3, Rec. 370. 
47 Willich Compel Aff., Para. 61, 67, 73,78, Rec. 310-312; Willich Dep., Rec. 1181. 
48 Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 19-20, Rec. 678-679; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 36-37, Rec. 302-303; Willich 
Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 13, Rec. 773. 
49 Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 19-20, Rec. 678-679; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 36-37, Rec. 302-303; Willich 
Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 13, Rec. 773. 
50 Willich Compel Aff., Para. 62, Rec. 307-308. 
51 Willich Compel Aff., Para. 63-65, 86, Rec. 308-309, 314; Willich Dep., Rec. i 191. 
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the Ball Investigation, other than that he could read the report prepared by Investigator Ball when 
it was complete52 . The Sun Valley City Council also provided no authority to Attorney Naylor to 
provide any direction to Investigator Ball or to be involved in the Ball Investigation53 . 
Former Mayor Willich expanded the Ball Investigation to include a) Ms. Hammer's 
harassment allegations against Defendant Ribi, b) a review of expenditures in the Sun Valley 
Fire Department, and, c) misconduct and financial mismanagement allegations of former Sun 
Valley Treasurer Michelle Frostenson ("Former Treasurer Frostenson")54. During the Ball 
Investigation, Ms. Hammer was only cursorily interviewed, and not allowed to rebut anything 
related to the Ball Investigation in order to defend herself55. 
Unknown to Former Mayor Willich, Attorney Naylor and Investigator Ball held at least 
sixty-eight (68) unauthorized one-on-one communications56 between November 23, 2011 and 
when Investigator Ball's report was completed on December 12, 2011 57 . The report (the 
"Original Ball/Naylor Report"), prepared jointly by Attorney Naylor and Investigator Ball58 , was 
presented to Former Mayor Willich59 on December 12, 2011. Former Mayor Willich considered 
52 Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 15, Rec. 677-678; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 26-27, 72, Rec. 299-300, 310: 
Willich Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 13, Rec. 772-773; Willich Dep., Rec. 1183. 
53 Youngman Dep., Rec. 1328. 
54 Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff .. Para. 16, Rec. 677-678; Willich Compel Aff.. Para. 32-33. Rec. 301-302; Briscoe 
Dep .. Rec. 1226, 1236, 1246; Ribi Dep., Rec. 1284-1285, 1305; Ball Ribi/Donoval Aff.. Para. 10. Rec. 629. 
55 Willich IHRC Aff., Para. 16-17, Rec. 670-671; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 46, Rec. 304; Lamb Dep., Rec. 1372. 
56 Willich IHRC Aff., Para. 15-16, Rec. 669-671; Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 17-18, 21, 25. Rec. 677-681; 
Willich Supp. Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 15, Rec. 539-540; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 34-35, 38-40, 47, 94, Rec. 
302-305, 315-316; Willich Dep., Rec. 1181-1186. 
57 See Privilege Log (Rec. 502-517) and Investigator Ball's Invoice (Rec. 326-329). 
58 Although only Investigator Ball put her name on the Original Ball/Naylor Report, considering the extensive 
communications between Investigator Ball and Attorney Naylor during the November 24, 2011 to December 12, 
2011 period, there is no question that Attorney Naylor was actively participating in the writing of the Original 
Ball/Naylor Report. 
59 Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 22, Rec. 679-681; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 41-43, Rec. 303-304. 
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Original Ball/Naylor Report, to have been improperly influenced by Attorney Naylor, to be 
not "credible", "junk" and an "attack piece" seeking to prosecute Ms. Hammer, and to exonerate 
Defendant Ribi of "serious" claims against Defendant Ribi, instead of being an independent 
report60. Former Mayor Willich ordered that the Original Ball/Naylor Report be kept under lock 
and key at City Attorney King's office, and not publicly released61 • 
Based on his own knowledge, and the fact that both he and the Sun Valley City Council 
had known of, and approved of, Ms. Hammer's use of compensatory time and the Sun Valley 
auto even for personal purposes, Former Mayor Willich exonerated Ms. Hammer of any 
misconduct62 , and provided Ms. Hammer with written confirmation of such 63. Former Mayor 
Willich's determination exonerating Ms. Hammer was "final and binding" pursuant to Section 
8.7 of the Sun Valley Personnel Policies 64. Former Mayor Willich determined that all matters 
related to allegations of misconduct against Ms. Hammer were concluded and final 65 , and 
informed Ms. Hammer in writing that all disciplinary matters related to her were "closed"66 . 
Former Mayor Willich advised Investigator Ball that she was "done" in regards to all matters 
60 Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 23-25, Rec. 679-681; Willich Compel. Aff.. Para. 40, 48, Rec. 303, 305; Willich 
Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 14, Rec. 773; Willich Dep., Rec. 1184. 
61 Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 22, Rec. 679-681; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 56-58, Rec. 306-307; Willich 
Supp. Compel Aff.. Para. 14. Rec. 773; Willich Dep., Rec. 1186; Briscoe Dep., Rec. 1227; Lamb Dep., Rec. 1369. 
62 Willich IHRC Aff.. Para. 16, Rec. 670-671; Willich Ribi/Donoval, Para. 23-24, Rec. 680; Willich Supp. 
Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 10, Rec. 538; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 50, 59, 84, Rec. 305,307,313; Willich Dep., 
Rec. 1187; Hammer Orig. IPPEA Aff, Para. 9-12, Rec. 554-556; Hammer Orig. IPPEA TRO Aff., Para. 13, Rec. 
647; Youngman Dep., Rec. 1333. 
63 Rec. 565; Hammer Orig. IPPEA Aff., Para. 9-12, Rec. 554-556. 
64 Rec. 174-175; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 3, 59, Rec. 294,307. 
65 Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff.. Para. 24, Rec. 680; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 84, Rec. 313. 
66 Rec. 665; Hammer Orig. IPPEA Aff., Para. iO, Rec. 555. 
18 
APPELLANT'S AMENDED BRIEF 
related to Ms. Hammer67 . Former Mayor Willich returned Ms. Hammer to active duty as the Sun 
Valley City Administrator68 , and completed Ms. Hammer's annual review which provided her 
with the highest ratings in all categories 69. Former Mayor Willich concluded that Ms. Hammer 
could not possibly have been considered to have done anything "criminal" based on taking 
compensatory time or using the Sun Valley auto, because it had been approved by himself and 
the Sun Valley City Council itself7°. 
Based on his knowledge of how Defendant Ribi had treated Ms. Hammer over the course 
of 2009 through 2011, Former Mayor Willich also ruled that Defendant Ribi violated the Sun 
Valley Anti-Harassment Policy in his actions towards Ms. Hammer71 . Former Mayor Willich's 
determination that Defendant Ribi violated the Sun Valley Anti-Harassment Policy was also a 
"final and binding" decision pursuant to Section 8. 7 of the Sun Valley Personnel Policies 72 . 
On December 16, 2011, Former Mayor Willich met with Attorney Naylor at Attorney 
Naylor's office in Boise73 . At that meeting, Former Mayor Willich did not consider Attorney 
Naylor to be either his or Sun Valley's attorney, nor did he consider that he was receiving any 
67 Willich Supp. Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 8, Rec. 537; Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff.. Para. 27, Rec. 681; Willich 
Compel Aff., Para. 52-55, Rec. 306; Willich Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 16, Rec. 774; Willich Dep .. Rec. 1186. 
68 Rec. 558; Willich IHRC Aff., Para. 16, Rec. 670-671; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 83, Rec. 313: Willich Dep., 
Rec. 1187; Hammer Orig, IPPEA Aff, Para. 7, Rec. 554; Hammer Orig. IPPEA TRO Aff., Para. 12, Rec. 555; 
Youngman Dep., Rec. 1333. 
69 Rec. 559-564; Hammer Orig. IPPEA Aff., Para. 8, Rec. 554. 
70 Willich Compel Aff., Para. 50, 79, Rec. 305,312; Hammer Orig. TRO Aff., Para. 13, Rec. 647. 
71 Willich IHRC Aff., Para. 17, Rec. 671; Willich Supp. Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 7, 12, Rec. 537-539; Willich 
Compel Aff., Para. 46, Rec. 304. 
72 Rec. 174-175; Willich Supp. Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 12, Rec. 538-539. 
73 Ms. Hammer requests the Court to read the entire Affidavit Of Former Mayor Willich in support of the Motion To 
Compel (Rec. 293-368) as it provides a chronological description of events between November 8, 2011 and January 
3, 2012, including extensive detail of Former Mayor Willich's December 16, 2011 meeting with Attorney Naylor. 
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legal advice from Attorney Naylor74. Former Mayor Willich told Attorney Naylor that he was 
not the attorney for the Bali Investigation and that all matters related to Ms. Hammer were 
finished75 . Former Mayor Willich did agree that administrative leave notices should be provided 
to several Sun Valley employees still on administrative leave (including Ms. Hammer), but did 
not consider that by doing so he was receiving legal advice from Attorney Naylor76 . 
At the December 16, 2011 meeting, Attorney Naylor aggressively sought to convince 
Former Mayor Willich that Ms. Hammer should be criminally investigated by the Blaine County 
Prosecutor, to which Former Mayor Willich replied: 
"I told Attorney Naylor that doing so was not part of his job in defending against the 
[Original IPPEA Law Suit]. I told Attorney Naylor that nothing that Former 
Administrator Hammer had done could possibly be considered to have been "criminal" 
because everything that she had been accused of had either been approved by myself or 
the Sun Valley City Council. However, I told Attorney Naylor that if he found anything 
that he could convince me of was "criminal" related to Sun Valley employees, that I 
would allow him to turn over the information to the Blaine County Prosecutor. Attorney 
Naylor gave me the document attached as Exhibit E (Rec. 334), which he said he would 
keep in his files if he ever needed it, which I signed. However, I told Attorney Naylor that 
I expected him to obtain my specific approval before he turned over documents to the 
Blaine County Prosecutor. In addition, I specifically told Attorney Naylor that he was not 
to provide the [Original Ball/Naylor Report] that I directed stay in City Attorney King's 
possession at City Attorney King's Ketchum, Idaho office to the Blaine County 
Prosecutor under any circumstances because of its multitude of flaws, errors and 
unauthorized and unwarranted conclusions." (Willich Compel Aff., Para. 79, Rec. 312) 
Former Mayor Willich acknowledged that several matters, unrelated to Ms. Hammer77, 
including serious allegations of financial misconduct against Former Treasurer Frostenson and 
74 Willich Compel. Aff., Para. 67-68, Rec. 309. 
75 Willich Compel Aff., Para. 75, Rec. 310. 
76 Willich Compel Aff., Para. 81, Rec. 312-313. 
77 Ms. Hammer emphasizes this because she asserts that Investigator Ball and Attorney Naylor purposefully 
disregarded Former Mayor Willich's instructions that all matters related to Ms. Hammer (as opposed to other Sun 
Valley issues) were complete as of December 13, 2011. 
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with the Sun Valley Fire Department, needed further investigation, but that Former Mayor 
Willich would not have time to complete those matters during the remainder of his term 78. 
Between December 13, 2011 and December 20, 2011, without Former Mayor Willich's 
knowledge or approval, Attorney Naylor and Investigator Ball surreptitiously held at least 
twenty eight (28) one-on-one communications 79 , and jointly prepared a revised version of the 
Original Ball/Naylor Report (the "Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report")80 which included new 
facts and findings related to Ms. Hammer81 • After December 13, 2011, until the end of Former 
Mayor Willich's term of office, Attorney Naylor had no further communications with Former 
Mayor Willich, nor was Former Mayor Willich ever made privy to the Unauthorized Ball/Naylor 
Report until Former Mayor Willich viewed the Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report in the on-line 
section of the Idaho Mountain Express a year later82 . The only communications in the Record On 
Appeal between Former Mayor Willich are two emails in the Privilege Log purportedly from 
Former Mayor Willi ch to Investigator Ball and City Attorney King on December 22, 2011 83 , 
which Fonner Mayor Willich has not been allowed to review and will not vouch for84. 
Still during the Willich Administration, and without Former Mayor Willich's 
78 Willich Orig. IPPEA Testimony, Rec. 656-657; Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 26, Rec. 681; Willich Compel 
Aff., Para. 45, 76-77, 81, 85, Rec. 304, 311-314; Willich Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 16-17, Rec. 774-775; Willich 
Dep., Rec. 1211. 
79 See Privilege Log (Rec. 502-517) and Investigator Balrs Invoice (Rec. 326-329). 
80 As was the case with the Original Ball/Naylor Report, although Attorney Naylor's name is not on the 
Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report, considering the extent of communications between [nvestigator Ball and Attorney 
Naylor during the week it was being prepared, there is no question that Attorney Naylor was co-authoring the 
Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report. 
81 Willich Supp. Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 5-6, 13-16, Rec. 535-537, 539-540; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 89-95, 
Rec. 314-315; Willich Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 16-17, Rec. 774-775. 
82 Willich Supp. Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 2-3, Rec. 535-537; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 87-88, Rec. 314-315; 
Briscoe Orig. IPPEA Aff., Para. 6, Rec. 636. 
83 Willich Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 7, Rec. 771. 
84 Willich Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 7-10, Rec. 770-771. 
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authorization and in disregard for Former Mayor Willich's explicit directions, Attorney Naylor 
contacted the Blaine County Prosecutor and/or provided the Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report to 
the Blaine County Prosecutor, seeking that a criminal investigation of Ms. Hammer be 
commenced85 . The Sun Valley City Council gave Attorney Naylor no authority to tum over the 
Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report to the Blaine County Prosecutor during the Post Election 
Period, nor did the Sun Valley City Council authorize Attorney Naylor to seek a criminal 
investigation of Ms. Hammer during the Post Election Period 86. He did so none-the-less. 
The Termination Of Ms. Hammer 
On January 3, 2012, Defendant Briscoe was sworn in as the new Mayor of Sun Valley87 . 
The next day, Defendant Briscoe issued notices to Ms. Hammer that she was being placed on 
administrative leave a second time, and that she was the target of a second disciplinary 
investigation 88. At the time, Ms. Hammer was provided no notice of what prompted the second 
disciplinary investigation or the second administrative leave89. Six (6) days later, on January 9, 
2012, Defendant Briscoe filed an Affidavit in the Original IPPEA Law Suit90 asserting that 
Defendant Briscoe was re-investigating Ms. Hammer for the same allegations she had already 
85 The Blaine County Prosecutor confirmed that "in December of 2011 (emphasis added)", still during the Willich 
Administration, he was contacted by "ICRMP attorney (emphasis added) Kirtlan Naylor to initiate a criminal 
investigation". (Rec. 430-434) At a January 11, 2012 hearing in the Original IPPEA Law Suit, Attorney Naylor 
confirmed that the Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report was turned over to the Blaine County Prosecutor seeking that 
Ms. Hammer be criminally investigated (1/11/12 Transcript, Rec. 386; Donoval Compel Aff., Para. 5, Rec. 371). 
86 Lamb Dep., Rec. 1371. 
87 Amended Complaint, Para. 145, Rec. 127. 
88 Rec. 957-958; Rec. 959-960; Hammer Orig. IPPEA TRO Aff., Para. 14, Rec. 647. 
89 Hammer Orig, IPPEA TRO Aff., Para. 14, Rec. 647. 
90 Rec. 635-639. 
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exonerated of by Former Mayor Willich associated with the Ball Investigation 91• Defendant 
Briscoe also asserted that he was investigating Ms. Hammer for her actions between December 
27, 2011 and January 3, 2012, when she still reported to Former Mayor Willich. 
Between January 5, 2012 and January 19, 2012, the Sun Valley City Council held three 
closed door executive sessions totaling twelve (12) hours, in which the misconduct allegations 
against Ms. Hammer, and Ms. Hammer's fate, were extensively discussed92 . On January 11, 
2012, Attorney Naylor disclosed to the District Court in the Original IPPEA Law Suit that he and 
the Briscoe Administration were seeking that Ms. Hammer be criminally investigated93 . Attorney 
Naylor also confirmed that, in regards to Ms. Hammer, he, personally, was "going to make sure 
she [Ms. Hammer] was criminally prosecuted and that her career would be ruined."94 On January 
18, 2012, the day before Ms. Hammer's termination, Attorney Naylor told Mr. Donoval that the 
Briscoe Administration would never retain Ms. Hammer as the Sun Valley City Administrator 
because she had sued Defendant Ribi and Sun Valley for Defendant Ribi's harassment95 . 
On January 19, 2012, Defendant Briscoe and the Sun Valley City Council jointly 
terminated Ms. Hammer pursuant to Section 3.A of the Employment Agreement (Rec. 1023-
91 Even though Section 8.7 of the Sun Valley Personnel Policies (Rec. 174-175) specifically states that all 
disciplinary decisions of the Mayor of Sun Valley are "final and binding''. the Briscoe Administration has asserted 
that Former Mayor Willich's exoneration of Ms. Hammer for misconduct allegations raised by Defendant Ribi and 
which were the subject of the Ball Investigation were not "final and binding" because the Ball Investigation was not 
completed, and that the Briscoe Administration could continue to pursue further disciplinary and criminal 
rroceedings against Ms. Hammer based on the same misconduct allegations. 
2 Briscoe Dep., Rec. 1218-1264; Ribi Dep., Rec. 1266-1312; Youngman Dep., Rec. 1314-1337; Suhadolnik Dep. 
Rec. 1339-1354. 
93 1/11/12 Transcript, Rec. 386; Donoval Compel Aff., Para. 5, Rec. 371. 
94 Donoval Compel. Aff., Para. 6, Rec. 371. 
95 Donoval Reconsider Aff., Para. 14, Supp.Rec. 33; Supp.Rec. 57. 
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1028; Exhibit A herein)96 (i.e. "without cause"). However, Defendant Ribi and Defendant 
Briscoe had previously made clear that they wanted Ms. Hammer terminated based on 
misconduct allegations. Sun Valley City Council Member Franz Suhadolnik ("Council Member 
Suhadolnik") admitted that he also voted to terminate Ms. Hammer because of evidence that she 
must have done something wrong97 , and the next day issued a letter to Ms. Hammer asserting 
that she had made "mistakes"98 . Defendant Ribi admitted in his deposition that legal counsel 
(presumably Attorney Naylor) advised the Briscoe Administration that Ms. Hammer could be 
terminated "without cause", even while the Briscoe Administration was publicly asserting she 
was guilty of misconduct, including criminal misconduct 99. 
The day after Ms. Hammer's termination, the Briscoe Administration published a paid for 
Press Release advertisement in the Idaho Mountain Express, authored by Attorney Naylor, 
announcing that Sun Valley was seeking that Ms. Hammer be criminally investigated 100. On 
January 25, 2012, the Briscoe Administration also published in the Idaho Mountain Express 
another paid ad (also authored by Attorney Naylor), announcing that Ms. Hammer was 
terminated pursuant to Section 3 .A of the Employment Agreement, without mentioning that she 
was actually terminated "without cause" 101 • The advertisements implied to the public that the 
Briscoe Administration had actually terminated Ms. Hammer because of criminal allegations. 
96 Rec. 962-966. 
97 See Council Member Suhadolnik's testimony (Suhadolnik Dep., Pg. 28, Line 6 to Pg. 34, Line 8, Rec. 1346-
1348). Council Member Suhadolnik states: 'The allegations were consistent and strong that there was at least 
numerous violations of the city personnel policy." (Suhadolnik, Dep .. Pg. 28, Line 25 to Pg. 29, Line 3, Rec. 1346). 
98 Suhadolnik Dep., Pg. 42, Line I to Pg. 49, Line 13, Rec. 1350-1351. 
99 Ribi Dep., Pg. 91, Line 5-7, Rec. 1289. 
100 Rec. 961; Briscoe Dep., Pg. 144, Line 22 to Pg. 145, Line 24, Rec. 1254. 
JQJR 0 6"' B' D P '"'0 T' J• L" t"7 R l">Cr.p '""O L' ">,">, P !"" 1 T' ·"' R J"r' ,ec. 7 , ; nscoe ep., g. u , Line to me 1 1, ec. 1 L.Jo; g. 1 1 , me LL m g. 1-', Lme L'+, ec. LO J. 
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The Submission Of The Supplemental Release And The Payment Of The "Severance" 
Upon Ms. Hammer being placed on administrative leave for a second time by the Briscoe 
Administration, Mr. Donoval submitted to Attorney Naylor at least three written 
communications (see Group Exhibit C herein) 102, and held a telephone conference with Attorney 
Naylor 103, related to Ms. Hammer's termination and the payment of the "severance" described in 
the Employment Agreement. Mr. Donoval made clear to Attorney Naylor that even if the Briscoe 
Administration paid Ms. Hammer the "severance" described in the Employment Agreement, she 
would not be waiving any non service, salary or benefit type of claims. The day before Ms. 
Hammer's termination, Mr. Donoval wrote to Attorney Naylor: 
"The causes of action Ms. Hammer possesses for tort, including the underlying 
harassment allegations against Council Member Ribi and several other claims, do not 
arise "from termination", they arise out of separate incidents. Nor is it rational to assert 
that Ms. Hammer would have waived any non-contract damage claims she would have 
prospectively been entitled to (personal injury claims) when she signed the agreement. So 
as I have stated, if the City Of Sun Valley proposes to terminate Ms. Hammer without 
cause and pays her the severance payment in the contract, she will only sign a waiver that 
states the exact language in the contract cited above and nothing more." (Supp.Rec. 60) 
On January 20, 2012, the day after her termination, Ms. Hammer issued a letter to Sun 
Valley, demanding payment of the "severance" required by the Employment Agreement, and 
included a signed release which mirrors language from the Employment Agreement (the 
"Original Hammer Release") (see Group Exhibit C herein) 104• 
On January 20, 2012 and January 21, 2012, Attorney Naylor submitted three emails to 
Mr. Donoval. The first email, rejected the Original Hammer Release and demanded that Ms. 
102 Rec. 1036, Supp. Rec. 53, Supp.Rec. 59-61. 
103 Donoval Recon. Aff., Para. 14, Supp.Rec. 33. 
104 Supp.Rec. 63-65. 
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Hammer include language of "I release all claims against the City Of Sun Valley" in a signed 
release, or the Briscoe Administration would not pay the "severance" described in the 
Employment Agreement (see Group Exhibit C herein) 105 . The second email confirmed that if 
Ms. Hammer did not include the "all claims" language in a release, the Briscoe Administration 
would not pay Ms. Hammer the "severance" described in the Employment Agreement (see 
Group Exhibit C herein) 106. The third email reiterated that Ms. Hammer must include the "all 
claims" language in a signed release, and included a release drafted by Attorney Naylor (the 
"Naylor Drafted Release"), which also included the "I release all claims ... against the City of 
Sun Valley" language Attorney Naylor demanded be included in a release or the Briscoe 
Administration would not pay Ms. Hammer the "severance" described in the Employment 
Agreement (see Group Exhibit C)107• 
Ms. Hammer rejected the Naylor Drafted Release, or the inclusion of the "all claims" 
language demanded by Attorney Naylor, and instead submitted the signed Supplemental Release 
(Exhibit B herein) to Attorney Naylor and Former Treasurer Frostenson108, which included the 
specific language that Ms. Hammer was only releasing "any claims defined in Section 3.A. of 
the City Administrator Employment Agreement as were intended when the City Administrator 
Employment Agreement was entered into on June 1, 2008 (emphasis added)" (the "Conditional 
Clause") 109. No further communications were received from Attorney Naylor. 
105 Rec. 1488. 
106 Supp.Rec. 69. 
107 Supp.Rec. 71-72. 
108 Supp.Rec. 78-79. 
109 Hammer SJ Aff., Para. 19-21, Rec. l O l 9- 1020; Hammer Recon. Aff., Para. i 8-24, Supp. Rec. 89-90. 
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At a January 23, 2012 meeting at Sun Valley City Hall, Former Treasurer Frostenson 
acknowledged to Mr. Donoval that the entire "severance" payment to be made to Ms. Hammer 
related solely to past services, wages and benefits, and none of the "severance" was related to 
any non wage types of claims of Ms.Hammer110. Based on Former Treasurer Frostenson's 
confirmation that none of the about to be paid "severance" payment related to any non service or 
wage types of claims, Mr. Donoval approved the withholding of employment taxes on the entire 
"severance" payment, which would not have been required for non-wage types of payments 111 • 
Without fmther communications from any Sun Valley officials, on January 24, 2012, the 
"severance" payment was direct deposited into Ms. Hammer's Chase Bank checking account' 12 . 
There is no evidence in the Record On Appeal that any Sun Valley official, other than Attorney 
Naylor and Former Treasurer Frostenson, were ever made aware of the actual specific language 
of the Supplemental Release or that the Supplemental Release did not include the "all claims" 
language that had been demanded by Attorney Naylor. Nor is there any evidence in the Record 
On Appeal of who made the decision to pay Ms. Hammer the "severance" the next day, or why. 
110 Donoval Reconsider Aff., Para. 29-32, Supp.Rec. 36-37. 
111 Supp.Rec. 81; Donoval Reconsider Aff., Para. 29-32. Supp.Rec. 36-37. 
112 Rec. 83; Hammer Recon. Aff., Para. 25, Rec. 9i. 
27 
APPELLANT'S AMENDED BRIEF 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I) Did the District Court err as a matter of law by entering summary judgment against Ms. 
Hammer, and in particular in finding that the Ms. Hammer had waived any rights to proceed 
against Sun Valley pursuant to the provisions of the IPPEA, by submitting the Supplemental 
Release on January 23, 2012 in order to receive contractual "severance" benefits described in the 
Employment Agreement Ms. Hammer entered into with Sun Valley on or about June 1, 2008? 
II) Did the District Court err as a matter of law by failing to recognize that Ms. Hammer had a 
cause of action under the IPPEA for adverse actions taken by Briscoe Administration officials 
after Ms. Hammer's termination and after Ms. Hammer supplied the Supplemental Release to 
Briscoe Administration officials on January 23, 2012? 
III) Did the District Court err as a matter of law in entering summary judgment against Ms. 
Hammer by finding that judicial estoppel barred Ms. Hammer from raising any claims against 
Sun Valley under the provisions of the IPPEA? 
IV) Did the District Court err as a matter of law by finding that personal liability does not attach 
to Defendant Ribi or Defendant Briscoe under the IPPEA? 
V) Did the District Court err as a matter of law that Sun Valley, Investigator Ball and Attorney 
Naylor possessed attorney-client and work product privileges related to the Ball Investigation, 
and the Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report, which was released to the public? 
VI) Did the District Court err in entering costs against Ms. Hammer? 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
Ms. Hammer seeks attorneys' fees on appeal, pursuant to I.A.R. 41, and pursuant to Idaho 
Statute 6-2106(5) which provides for attorney's fees to a successful litigant under the IPPEA. 
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ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I) Did the District Court err as a matter of law by entering summary judgment 
against Ms. Hammer, and in particular in finding that Ms. Hammer had waived any rights 
to proceed against Sun Valley pursuant to the provisions of the IPPEA, by submitting the 
Supplemental Release on January 23, 2012 in order to receive contractual "severance" 
benefits described in the Employment Agreement Ms. Hammer entered into with Sun 
Valley on or about June 1, 2008? 
Summary Judgment In General 
The entry of summary judgment at the district court level is reviewed on appeal by this 
Court de novo, AED, Inc. v. KDC Investments, LLC, 155 Idaho 159, 307 P.3d 176 (Id. Sup.Ct. 
2013 ), with this Court exercising free review in determining whether any genuine issues of 
material fact exist and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, Miller 
v. Simonson, 140 Idaho 287, 289, 92 P.3d 537 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2004). De Novo generally means a 
new hearing or a hearing for the second time, Beker Industries, Inc. v. Georgetown Irr. Dist., 101 
Idaho 187,190,610 P.2d 546 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1980), requiring that none of a district court's findings 
related to the summary judgment are to be taken into consideration on appeal. In fact, in Roe v. 
Albertson's, Inc., 141 Idaho 524,527, 112 P.3d 812 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2005) this Court stated that 
"because our review is de novo, providing summary judgment transcripts that contained the 
parties' arguments is not necessary for appellate review." 
On appeal, this Court's determination of whether summary judgment should be entered is 
the same as that required of the district court itself when originally ruling on the summary 
judgment motion (Roe v. Albertson's, 527). Thus, summary judgment should only be granted 
where the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show there is no genuine issues as to any material fact and the petitioner is entitled to a judgment 
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as a matter of law, l.R.C.P. 56(c); Shapley v. Centurion L~fe Ins. Co., 154 Idaho 875,877,303 
P.3d 234 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2013). The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact rests with the moving party, Harris v. State, 147 Idaho 401,405, 210 P.3d 86 (Id. 
Sup.Ct. 2009). In determining whether the burden has been met, any disputed material facts are 
to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and this Court must make all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the party resisting the motion, McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 
769,820 P.2d 360 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1991). In Crane v. Banner, 93 Idaho 69, 73-74, 455 P.2d 313 (Id. 
Sup.Ct. 1969), this Court emphasized that "this Court has repeatedly stated that upon a motion 
for summary judgment all doubts (emphasis added) are to be resolved against the moving party." 
In Sutton v. Brown, 85 Idaho 104, 109, 375 P.2d 990 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1962) this Court stated: 
"fact allegations contained in an affidavit opposing a motion for summary judgment must be 
accepted as true (emphasis added)." 
The Legal Standards Regarding Waiver 
In the 2011 case of Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449,259 P.3d 595 (Id. 
Sup.Ct. 2011), Justice Burdick detailed the Idaho Supreme Court's definition of "waiver". 
In Knipe Land v. Robertson, in summarizing several previous Idaho cases, Justice Burdick wrote: 
"A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage, and 
the party asserting the waiver must show that he acted in reasonable reliance upon it and 
that he thereby has altered his position to his detriment. Waiver is foremost a question of 
intent. A clear intention to waive must be shown before waiver shall be established. 
Waiver will not be inferred except from a clear and unequivocal act manifesting an intent 
to waive, or from conduct amounting to estoppel. Waiver is a mixed question of law and 
fact. First a court must find the facts alleged to constitute waiver are true. Second, the 
court must decide whether, if true, those facts suffice as a matter of law to show waiver." 
(Knipe Land v. Robertson, @457-458) (internal citations omitted). 
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The Court should also adopt the language of the Missouri Appellate Court in Frisella 
RVB Corp., 979 S.W.2d 474,477 (Mo. App.E.D. 1998) regarding waiver, namely: 
"To rise to the level of waiver, the conduct must be manifestly consistent with and 
indicative of an intention to renounce a particular right or benefit that no other reasonable 
explanation of the conduct is possible." 
This Court has stated that the existence of waiver "is foremost a question of intent. In 
order to establish waiver the intention to waive must clearly appear" on the document purporting 
to be a waiver itself, Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782, 839 
P.2d 1192 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1992). And, this Court has directed that if there is any substantial 
evidence in the record" regarding the existence or non existence of a waiver, "it is for the trier of 
fact" (i.e. a jury) to determine whether the evidence establishes a waiver or not, Riverside 
Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515,519,650 P.2d 657 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1982). 
The Legal Standards Regarding Ambiguity 
Knipe Land v. Robertson also described this Court's definition of whether a document is 
"ambiguous", thus requiring extrinsic evidence to be used to determine the intent of the parties. 
In Knipe Land v. Robertson, Justice Burdick, in summarizing several Idaho cases, described that: 
"When interpreting a contract, this Court begins with the document's language. In the 
absence of ambiguity, the document must be construed in its plain, ordinary and proper 
sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain wording of the instrument. 
Interpreting an unambiguous contract and determining whether there has been a violation 
of that contract is an issue of law subject to free review. A contract term is ambiguous 
when there are two different reasonable interpretations or the language is nonsensical. 
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law, but interpreting an ambiguous term 
is an issue of fact. 
Whether an ambiguity exists in a legal instrument is a question of law, over which this 
Court exercises free review. Where a legal instrument is found to be unambiguous the 
legal effect must be decided by the district court as a matter of law; it is only when the 
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instrument is found to be ambiguous that evidence as to the meaning of that instrument 
may be submitted to the trier of fact 
There are two types of ambiguity, patent and latent. A patent ambiguity is an ambiguity 
clear from the face of the instrument in question. Idaho courts look solely to the face of a 
written agreement to determine whether it is patently ambiguous ... A latent ambiguity 
exists where an instrument is clear on its face, but loses that clarity when applied to the 
facts as they exist. Although parol evidence generally cannot be submitted to contradict, 
vary, add or subtract from the terms of a written agreement that is deemed unambiguous 
on its face, there is an exception to this general rule where a latent ambiguity appears. 
Where the facts in existence reveal a latent ambiguity in a contract, the court seeks to 
determine what the intent of the parties was at the time they entered into the contract." 
Knipe Land v. Robertson, @454-455) (internal citations omitted). 
The Supplemental Release 
On January 23, 2012, Ms. Hammer submitted the Supplemental Release to Attorney 
Naylor and Briscoe Administration officials 113, which stated, in its entirety, as follows: 
SUPPLEMENTAL RELEASE PURSUANT TO CITY ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYMENT 
AGREEMENT 
"Upon payment of the severance payment required pursuant to section 3.A of the City 
Administrator Employment Agreement dated June I, 2008, I release the City Of Sun Valley 
for any claims defined in Section 3.A of the City Administrator Employment Agreement as 
were intended when the City Administrator Agreement was entered into on June 1, 2008 
(the "Conditional Clause") ( emphasis added)" (Rec. 79, Exhibit B herein). 
The language of the Supplemental Release far from releases "all claims against the City 
of Sun Valley", as had been demanded by Attorney Naylor. 
lA) The Employment Agreement Was Not Incorporated Into The Supplemental Release 
In order for an "incorporation by reference" to occur, the parties must "clearly 
communicate that the purpose of the reference is to incorporate the referenced material into" the 
second document, Northrup Grumman v. U.S., 535 F.3d 1339, 1345 (U.S. Fed.App. 2008). Mere 
113 Supp.Rec. 78-79. 
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reference to a second document does not "automatically result in 'wholesale incorporation' " of 
the referred to document into the first, Precision Pine & Timber v. U.S., 596 F.3d 817 (U.S. 
Fed.App. 2010); Minshew v. Donley, 2012 WL 3231027, 911 F.Supp.2d 1043, 1059 (U.S. Nev. 
2012). In Intesa Sanpaolo v. Credit Agricole Corp. And Investment Bank, 2013 WL 4856199, 3 
(U.S. S.D.N.Y 2013), the U.S. Court for the Southern District Of New York described that: 
"While express identification of a document is a necessary condition for incorporation of 
that document, it is not a sufficient one. In addition to language explicitly identifying the 
referenced document, there must also be language that 'clearly communicates that the 
purpose of the reference is to incorporate the referenced material into the contract, rather 
than merely to acknowledge that the referenced material is relevant to the contract, e.g. as 
background'" (@3) (citing Northrup Grumman v. U.S. @ 1345). 
As was stated in Precision Pine v. U.S., @ 826, "If the parties had intended to incorporate 
[the ESA], they could have done so expressly, through an integration clause." 
The Supplemental Release merely put the Briscoe Administration on notice that there 
were certain claims that Ms. Hammer did not intend to release when she entered into the 
Employment Agreement. That was made clear to Attorney Naylor leading up to the submission 
of the Supplemental Release. The Supplemental Release includes no specific language 
incorporating the Employment Agreement, or any part of it, into the Supplemental Release. 
JB) The Briscoe Administration's Conduct At The Time Of The Submission Of The 
Supplemental Release And Payment Of The "Severance" Shows That The Briscoe 
Administration Acknowledged That Ms. Hammer Had Not Waived Any Non Wage Or Service 
Related Claims, Including Claims Under The IPPEA. 
Prior to the submission of the Supplemental Release to Briscoe Administration officials 
on January 23, 2012, Attorney Naylor was sent numerous communications confirming that Ms. 
Hammer was not going to release any non service or non wage types of claims in order to receive 
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"severance" she was due under the Employment Agreement (see Exhibit C herein) 114. Ms. 
Hammer received several communications back from Attorney Naylor in response making clear 
that under no circumstances would the Briscoe Administration pay Ms. Hammer the "severance" 
unless Ms. Hammer provided the Briscoe Administration with a signed release which 
specifically stated "I release all claims against the City of Sun Valley" (see Exhibit C herein) 115. 
Ms. Hammer, instead, submitted the non-compliant Supplemental Release which did not release 
"all claims", and certainly not specifically any IPPEA claims - and the Briscoe Administration 
paid her the "severance" anyway. 
Also, on January 23, 2012, Former Treasurer Frostenson confirmed to Mr. Donoval that 
the entire "severance" to be paid to Ms. Hammer only related to wage types of claims, not to any 
liquidated damages or other types of compensation 116. Former Treasurer Frostenson confirmed 
that the Briscoe Administration would withhold employment taxes on the entire "severance", 
which would not be required if the "severance" included non wage types of payment117 . 
The silence of Attorney Naylor and the conduct of Former Treasurer Frostenson, and the 
payment of the "severance" by direct deposit without any further communications, justified Ms. 
Hammer to believe that the Briscoe Administration had agreed that Ms. Hammer's "severance" 
did not include settlement of any non wage claims, such as those under the IPPEA, as Ms. 
Hammer had asserted, and that the issue was resolved in Ms. Hammer's favor. 
Briscoe Administration officials were well aware that Ms. Hammer was reserving her 
114 Rec. I 036, Supp.Rec. 53, Supp.Rec. 60-61. 
115 Rec. 1488, Supp.Rec. 69, Supp.Rec. 71-72. 
116 Donoval Recon. Aff., Para. 29-32, Supp.Rec. 36-37; Supp.Rec. 81. 
117 Donoval Recon. Aff., Para. 29-32, Supp.Rec. 36-37; Supp.Rec. 81. 
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rights to continue to bring certain claims even if she was paid the "severance", and were well 
aware that Ms. Hammer had rejected the "all claims against the City of Sun Valley" language 
Attorney Naylor had demanded - and paid her the "severance" anyway. Through three years of 
extensive litigation, Briscoe Administration officials have, instead, perpetrated the fiction that 
Ms. Hammer voluntarily waived claims under the IPPEA, or somehow fraudulently induced the 
Briscoe Administration to pay the "severance", when she had done neither. 
A waiver of Ms. Hammer's IPPEA claims should not be forced upon Ms. Hammer based 
on trickery - which describes Attorney Naylor's and the Briscoe Administration's conduct. 
Based on the circumstances related to the submission of the Supplemental Release, and the 
conduct of Attorney Naylor, Treasurer Frostenson and the Briscoe Administration, Ms. Hammer 
certainly did not knowingly and unequivocally release "all claims", including claims under the 
IPPEA, when she submitted the Supplemental Release to Briscoe Administration officials, and 
was then paid the "severance" by direct deposit. Summary judgment should be vacated. 
JC) The Supplemental Release Is Not Ambiguous. Thus, There Is No Need To Look Outside 
The Four Corners Of The Supplemental Release To Deny The Briscoe Administration's 
Request For Summary Judgment. 
The phrase "all claims" is not included anywhere in the Supplemental Release. Nor does 
the language of the Supplemental Release specifically release any claims under the IPPEA. The 
Briscoe Administration's fallacious argument has been, and will inevitably continue to be, that 
Ms. Hammer was supposed to have submitted a release which released "all claims" based on the 
language of the separate Employment Agreement, and even if she did not, she still somehow 
waived "all claims", including claims under the IPPEA, anyway. 
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This Court must look only at the four comers of the Supplemental Release to determine 
whether Ms. Hammer released "all" claims (see Hecla Mining v. Star-Morning Mining, @782 -
the waiver must clearly appear on the document purporting to be a waiver itself). And in doing 
so, the Court must recognize that there is a big difference between the "all claims against the 
City of Sun Valley" language that had been demanded by Attorney Naylor and the Briscoe 
Administration, and the "any claims ... as were intended when the City Administrator 
Agreement was entered into" language the Briscoe Administration received in response. 
The Supplemental Release is clear on its face, and is not ambiguous. By the language of 
the Supplemental Release, Ms. Hammer retained the right to pursue "some" claims even if the 
Briscoe Administration paid her the "severance" described in the Employment Agreement. All 
language in a contract must have been intended to have been inserted for a purpose, Wright v. 
Village Of Wilder, 63 Idaho 122, 117 P.2d 1002, 1002 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1941) - Contract must be so 
construed as to give force and effect to every part thereof) (see also Ace Realty, Inc. v. Anderson, 
106 Idaho 742, 749-750, 682 P.2d 1289 (Id. App.Ct. 1984). What else could the language of the 
Conditional Clause mean - other than that Ms. Hammer was retaining "some" claims, including 
those claims she did not intend she would be required to release when she signed the 
Employment Agreement, such as statutory claims. Otherwise, logic dictates that she would have 
used the phrase "all claims" in the Supplemental Release, as Attorney Naylor was adamantly 
demanding, or simply sign the Naylor Drafted Release. 
The Court need not look to the Employment Agreement to find out what claims Ms. 
Hammer intended to prospectively release when she signed the Employment Agreement in 2008 
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it simply needs to ask Ms. Hammer what those claims are. Wage claims? Yes. Vacation pay 
claims? Yes. Overtime pay claims? - Yes. Tort claims? - No. Workmen's compensation 
claims? - No. IPPEA claims? - NO! If the Briscoe Administration didn't like that Ms. Hammer 
held unilateral discretion related to claims she retained if paid the "severance", it should have 
asked for another version of a release before paying the "severance". Having failed to do so - the 
Briscoe Administration cannot complain it was fraudulently induced into paying the "severance" 
or somehow damaged. 
The Supplemental Release is not ambiguous. It reserves Ms. Hammer's right to decide 
the particular claims, including IPPEA claims, which were not intended to be released if Ms. 
Hammer was ever terminated. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of Sun Valley was in error. 
JD) Based On The Specific Language Of The Supplemental Release, And Ms. Hammer's 
Affidavit That She Did Not Intend To Waive Any Potential Future Claims Under The IPPEA 
When She Signed The Employment Agreement In June Of 2008, Summary Judgment Should 
Have Been Entered In Ms. Hammer's Favor As To The Waiver Issue. 
Ms. Hammer submitted Affidavits confirming that she did not intend to prospectively 
waive claims under the IPPEA that might arise during her employment or as part of her 
termination when she entered into the Employment Agreement with Sun Valley in June of 
2008 118. Former Mayor Willich' s Affidavits confirm the same from his perspective as the 
authorized representative of Sun Valley at the time 119• 
There is no genuine issue of material fact that Ms. Hammer did not intend to 
prospectively waive any claims under the IPPEA when she signed the Employment Agreement 
118 Hammer SJ Aff., Para. 7-11, Rec. 1017-1018; Hammer Recon. Aff., Para. 8-12, Supp.Rec. 85-87. 
119 Willich IHRC Aff., Para. 4, Rec. 663; Willich SJ Aff., Para. 6-9, Rec. 1043; Willich Recon. Aff., Para. 5-11, 
Supp.Rec. 114-116. 
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in June of 2008, and that the Supplemental Release specifically reserved Ms. Hammer's right to 
proceed on any claims that she did not intend to waive when she signed the Employment 
Agreement. Therefore, Ms. Hammer requests that the Court enter summary judgment in Ms. 
Hammer's favor, that as a matter of law, Ms. Hammer did not waive her right to bring claims 
under the IPPEA due to the submission of the Supplemental Release to the Briscoe 
Administration and having received the "severance", and remand the matter back to the District 
Court without any further proceedings related to the "waiver" issue. 
JE) The "Severance" Paid To Ms. Hammer Has Been Defined By The U.S. Supreme Court, 
And This Court, As Only Being Related To Past Services Rendered Or Performed, Not To 
Statutory Claims Or Liquidated Damages. Thus, As A Matter Of Law, Payment Of The 
"Severance" Described In The Employment Agreement Did Not Include Settlement Of Non 
Salary Related Claims, Including IP PEA Claims. 
In 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court defined "severance" to be "wages" for "services" 
rendered to an employer. The issue in the 2014 case of U.S. v. Quality Stores, 134 S.Ct. 1395 
(U.S. Sup.Ct. 2014) was whether an employer was required to withhold employment and FICA 
taxes on "severance" payments made to employees when the company closed. In discussing what 
"severance" payments are, the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Quality Stores, 1399-1400 stated: 
"Severance payments made to terminated employees are 'remuneration for employment'. 
Severance payments are, of course, 'remuneration', and common sense dictates that 
employees receive the payments 'for employment' ... Severance payments are made in 
consideration for employment - for a 'service ... performed' by 'an employee for the 
person employing him.' " 
Even before the U.S. Supreme Court's 2014 ruling related to what "severance" means, 
this Court, in Parker v. Underwriters Laboratories, 140 Idaho 517, 96 P.3d 618 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 
2004 ), similarly discussed what "severance" was by stating: 
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" 'Severance pay' has been defined as 'a sum of money usually based on length of 
employment for which an employee is eligible upon termination.' ( citing to the .4merican 
Heritage Dictionary Of the English Language, 4th Edition, 2000). The purpose of a 
severance plan is to protect employees from economic hardship and to reward them for 
past services rendered (emphasis added)." (citing to 27 Am.Jur.2d, Employment 
Relationships, Sec. 70) (@ 520) 
The Parker v. Underwriters Court then cited to a Colorado case of Moore v. Digital 
Equipment, 868 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Colo. App.Ct. 1994) by stating that "A severance allowance is 
a payment made to an employee in return/or services previously provided (emphasis added)." 
The Supplemental Release gives no definition of what Ms. Hammer was about to receive 
other than as "severance". And, the phrase "severance" is found at least five (5) times in the 
Employment Agreement. Neither the phrase "liquidated damages", nor any other definition of 
what the funds Ms. Hammer would receive if she was terminated "without cause", other than 
"severance", is described anywhere else in either document. As the U.S. Supreme Court and this 
Court have defined "severance" as wages for past services rendered or performed, as a matter of 
law, it was error for the District Court to find that any "severance" paid to Ms. Hammer by the 
Briscoe Administration was either in the form of payment for settlement of statutory claims 
(such as under the IPPEA) or "liquidated damages" as was described in the Summary Judgment 
Order. Ms. Hammer prays that this Court enter a finding that "severance", as defined in the 
Employment Agreement and the Supplemental Release, and as actually paid, meant payment for 
services previously performed by Ms. Hammer up to the time of her termination, and for nothing 
more, including as liquidated damages or settlement of other claims, including IPPEA claims. 
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JF) The Court Must Interpret The Employment Agreement Based On The Intent Of The 
Parties When The Employment Agreement Was Entered Into, .4nd Not Retroactively ,4llow 
The Briscoe Administration To Redefine The Terms Of The Employment Agreement. 
Ms. Hammer and Former Mayor Willich have sworn that in reviewing the Employment 
Agreement drafted by Former City Attorney Peebles in 2008, they both accepted the common 
definition of "severance" as relating only to remuneration for past services rendered, and that 
neither considered that by entering into the Employment Agreement that should Ms. Hammer 
ever be terminated "without cause" she would be waiving any non-wage related claims 120. 
In interpreting a contract, the Court must look to the intent of the parties "at the time the 
contract was made", Opportunity, LLC v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 38 P.3d 1258 (Idaho 
Sup.Ct. 2002). Thus, the Court must look to the intent of Ms. Hammer and Former Mayor 
Willich when the Employment Agreement was signed, not the retroactive interpretation of the 
Briscoe Administration which did not participate in the negotiations of the Employment 
Agreement, and enter summary judgment in Ms. Hammer's favor. 
JG) Both Ms. Hammer And Former Mayor Willich Have Confirmed That The Employment 
Agreement Should Have Excluded The Waiver O(Non Service Or Wage Related Claims, Such 
As Statutory Claims, I(Ms. Hammer Was Terminated "Without Cause". Therefore, The Court 
Should Reform The Contract To Confirm Such. 
When both parties to a contract have made a mistake (i.e. a mutual mistake), which is 
substantial or fundamental as to defeat the objectives of the parties, Primary Health Network v. 
Idaho Dept. Of Admin., 137 Idaho 663, 668, 52 P.3d 307 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2002), equity requires the 
contract to be reformed to reflect the intent of the parties at the time the contract was entered 
120 Hammer SJ Aff., Para. 7-11, Rec. 1017-1018; Hammer Recon. Aff., Para. 8-12, Supp.Rec. 85-87. Willich IHRC 
Aff., Para. 4, Rec. 663; Willich SJ Aff., Para. 6-9, Rec. 1043; Willich Recon. Aff., Para. 5-11, Supp.Rec. 114-116. 
Donoval Recon Aff., Para. 6-9, Rec. 31-32. 
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Collins v. Parkinson, 96 Idaho 294, 296, 527 P.2d 1252 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1974). In that situation, 
the Court is not making a new contract, but rather "enforcing the agreement the parties would 
have made but for the mistake", Collins v. Parkinson @296, citing Exum v. Portnell:f- Marsh 
Valley Irr. Co., 38 Idaho 155, 200 P. 112 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1923). To determine what the correct 
provisions of the contract should have been, the Court is allowed to use parol evidence, Exum v. 
Portnell:f-Marsh; Bilbao v. Krettinger, 91 Idaho 69, 73,415 P.2d 712 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1966)). The 
Court then reforms the instrument "to reflect the intention of the parties, i.e. the agreement the 
parties would have made but for the mistake", Bailey v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 640, 671 P.2d 
1099 (Id. App.Ct. 1983) citing Exum v. Portneuf-Marsh. 
The uncontroverted statements of both Ms. Hammer and Former Mayor Willich, are that 
when the Employment Agreement was entered into in June of 2008, neither intended that Ms. 
Hammer was required to waive any statutory claims, such as IPPEA claims, if she was ever 
terminated "without cause" and paid the "severance" described in the Employment Agreement. 
The evidence of Ms. Hammer's and Former Mayor Willich' s intent is "clear and satisfactory" 
(see Collins v. Parkinson @ 296). Ms. Hammer121 and Former Mayor Willich122 have confirmed 
that if there was any doubt about their understanding of what was to be released if Ms. Hammer 
was ever terminated by Sun Valley in order for Ms. Hammer to obtain the "severance", they 
would have added specific language to the Employment Agreement confirming their mutual 
understanding on the issue. Therefore, the Court should reform the Employment Agreement to 
121 Hammer Aff., Para. 3-11, Rec. 1016-1020; Hammer Recon. Aff., Para. 6-12, Supp.Rec. 84-92. 
122 Willich IHRC Aff., Para. 4, Rec. 661-672; Willich Aff., Para. 3-9, Rec. 1042-1044; and Willich Recon. Aff., 
Para. 4-11, Supp.Rec. 113-117. 
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specifically include that Ms. Hammer was not (is not) required to waive any statutory or non 
service or wage related claims, including specifically claims under the IPPEA, due to the 
payment of the "severance" described in the Employment Agreement. 
lH) The Assertion That Ms. Hammer Prospectively Waived Any Statutory Claims, Such As 
Those Under The IP PEA, When She Entered Into The Employment Agreement In June of 
2008, Violates Public Policy Prohibiting The Prospective Waiver O(Statutory Claims. 
In 1974, in the seminal case of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 50, 94 S.Ct. 
1011 (U.S. Sup.Ct. 1974), in describing whether an employee could prospectively waive rights 
under Title VII, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that, although procedural rights could be 
prospectively waived (such as whether an employee must seek recourse under Title VII through 
arbitration), the prospective waiver of an employee's substantive rights under Title VII through 
contract or settlement agreement was violative of public policy, and thus "not susceptible of 
prospective waiver". Even when an employee has agreed to waive past conduct of the employer 
(as the Briscoe Administration has claimed Ms. Hammer did by signing the Supplemental 
Release) the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that waiver of statutorily protected rights in a 
settlement agreement must be "clear and unmistakable" and "explicitly stated", Wright v. 
Universal Maritime Service Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80, 119 S.Ct. 391 (U.S. Sup.Ct. 1998)123. 
As to what this Court has done related to Idaho statutes, in Lee v. Sun Valley, 107 Idaho 
976, 979, 695 P.2d 361 (Idaho Sup.Ct. 1984) (although not discussing employment agreements), 
this Court stated that agreements between parties cannot absolve a party from liability for 
123 Nowhere in the Employment Agreement or the Supplemental Release is there any specific mention of the iPPEA. 
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violations of the public policy imposed by statutes." 124 
The Court is requested to review three federal cases which follow the same fact pattern 
and cover the same prospective waiver issues in employment contracts at issue here, for 
guidance (namely, Adams v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 67 F.3d 580 (U.S. App.6th 1995); Rieghard v. 
Limbach Co., 158 F.Supp.2d 730 (U.S. E.D.Virg. 2001); and, Richardson v. Sugg, 448 F.3d 1046 
(U.S. App.81h 2006)). In all three cases federal courts struck down attempts by employers to 
enforce prospective waiver provisions in employee contracts. 
In Adams v. Philip Morris, the U.S. 6th Circuit Appellate Court stated that "Where a 
release waives rights unknown to the releaser at the time of signing of the waiver, or, as in this 
case, the claimant waives rights protecting against conduct that has not yet occurred, the release 
must be particularly scrutinized as to the intent of the parties." (@ 584) The Adams v. Phillip 
Morris Court went on to state: 
"The scope of the release, like any contract, depends on ascertaining the intent of the 
parties at the time of signing the release. The dispositive inquiry is "what did the parties 
intend?" Intent is determined by reviewing the language of the entire instrument and all 
surrounding facts and circumstances under which the parties acted in light of the 
applicable law as to employment discrimination at the time. It is necessary to examine all 
the circumstances surrounding the formation of the release." (@ 585) 
In Rieghard v. Limbach Co., the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 
found that prospective waivers in employment contracts if allowed, would have the "pernicious 
effect of tending to encourage violations by assuring the wrongdoers that they may act with 
impunity." (@732-733) The Rieghard v. Limbach Co. Court concluded that "Where, as here, a 
124 In Lee v. Sun Valley. the statute at issue was Idaho Statute 6-1204 related to the standard of care fur outfitters. 
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covenant not to sue purports to waive prospectively any future rights or claims under ERISA, the 
result, in effect, is to grant the employer a license to violate ERISA in the future with impunity. 
ERISA rights are too important to permit this result." (@733) 
Finally, this Court should pay particular attention to the Richardson v. Sugg case, in 
which former University of Arkansas' basketball coach Nolan Richardson's ("Coach 
Richardson") contract had almost the exact same language as Ms. Hammer's Employment 
Agreement, and Coach Richardson was paid a $500,000 severance payment when he was 
terminated. The U.S. 3th Circuit Appellate Court ruled that Coach Richardson had not 
prospectively waived his Title VII civil rights claims when he signed his contract, 
notwithstanding the waiver language in the contract, and that he had already been paid the 
$500,000 severance payment. The Richardson v. Sugg Court confirmed that "the public policy 
concerns that inhere in allowing prospective waivers of Title VII rights support the conclusion 
that such waiver is invalid" (@ 1054 ), and went on to state: 
"First ... allowing an employee to bargain away the right to pursue a prospective 
discrimination claim frustrates this statutory scheme. Second, allowing employers to ink 
a deal with an employee to waive prospective claims strikes at the heart of Congress' aim 
to deter discriminatory conduct by employers." (@1054-1055) 
The Richardson v. Suggs Court cited the language of Adams v. Philip Morris that: 
"An employer cannot purchase a license to discriminate. An employer cannot purchase a 
license to avoid its duty to eliminate practices which perpetuate prior discriminatory acts 
any more than it can circumvent its responsibility for future acts of purposeful 
discrimination." (@585) 
This Court should refuse to allow the Briscoe Administration to assert that provisions of 
the Employment Agreement, which purport to prospectively waive Ms. Hammer's statutory 
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IPPEA claims are void as against public policy. Nor should this Court allow the Briscoe 
Administration's claims that the Supplemental Release waived unspecified IPPEA claims. 
ll) As The Employment Agreement Only Refers To Payments Made To Ms. Hammer Upon 
Termination As Being "Severance", The Briscoe Administration Was Required To Provide 
Ms. Hammer With Additional Consideration For The Waiver O(Any Non Wage Or Service 
Related Claims, Such As Any Claims Under The IPPEA. 
For an employee to waive statutory rights, the employer must provide additional 
consideration for such waiver, above and beyond what the employee is already entitled to, 
E.E.O.C. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 778 F.3d 444,449 (U.S. App.3rd 2015). The Employment 
Agreement and the Supplemental Release both describe that the funds that Ms. Hammer was 
receiving was considered "severance". Nowhere else in the Employment Agreement or the 
Supplemental Release is there a description that "severance" includes payment for other claims 
such as liquidated damages or other "enhanced benefits" (as in Parker v. Underwriter's) by 
which Ms. Hammer was releasing any rights she may have also had under the IPPEA. Therefore, 
as no additional consideration was provided to Ms. Hammer specifically related to a release of 
any IPPEA claims, the payment of "severance" did not release Ms. Hammer's IPPEA claims. 
ISSUE II) Did the District Court err as a matter of law by failing to recognize that Ms. 
Hammer had a cause of action under the IPPEA for adverse actions taken by Briscoe 
Administration officials after Ms. Hammer's termination and after Ms. Hammer supplied 
the Supplemental Release to Briscoe Administration officials on January 23, 2012? 
Even if Ms. Hammer waived any claims which occurred prior to her termination, 
pursuant to the IPPEA, she is entitled to pursue claims against Sun Valley for its adverse actions 
after her termination, including subjecting her to continued investigations (both within Sun 
Valley and by outside agencies) and by issuing defamatory reports and statements. Idaho Statute 
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=-"~= broadly states that an "Adverse action" means to "discharge, threaten or otherwise 
discriminate against an employee in any manner". However, Idaho Statute 6-2103 does not limit 
when the adverse action must occur or that it only applies to current employees. Federal cases 
have extended claims for "adverse actions" to post-termination conduct, Pardi v. Kaiser 
Foundation, 389 F.3d 840, 850 (U.S. App.91h 2004) and threats of criminal charges, Dahlia v. 
Rodriguez, 735 F,3d 1060, 1079 (U.S. App.9th 2013), including that the U.S. Court for Idaho 
stated that a "campaign of harassment and humiliation could be deemed an adverse action", 
Ledford v. Idaho Dept. Of Juvenile Corr., 2014 WL 884546, 4 (U.S. Idaho 2014). 
Since Ms. Hammer did not include prospective adverse actions of Sun Valley in the 
Supplemental Release, even if this Court finds that Ms. Hammer waived pre-termination claims, 
Ms. Hammer should be allowed to proceed on her claims that adverse actions the Briscoe 
Administration took after her termination, are actionable under the IPPEA. 
ISSUE III) Did the District Court err as a matter of law in entering summary judgment 
against Ms. Hammer by finding that judicial estoppel barred Ms. Hammer from raising 
any claims against Sun Valley under the provisions of the IPPEA? 
As part of the Summary Judgment Order (Rec. 1507-1517), the District Court found that 
Ms. Hammer was judicially estopped from bringing her IPPEA claims because she asserted that 
the Briscoe Administration had purportedly terminated her "without cause", but that in reality 
Ms. Hammer was terminated either a) because of allegations of misconduct that had been raised 
against her as part of the Ball Investigation, b) in retaliation for her complaints of harassment 
against Defendant Ribi, or, c) for filing the Original IPPEA Law Suit and a Complaint with the 
IHRC. The District Court raised the issue of judicial estoppel sua sponte at the oral arguments on 
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summary judgment (Transcript 12/16/14), and then included it in the Summary Judgment Order. 
Even though Ms. Hammer raised the issue in her extensive reconsideration request (Supp.Rec. 
30-173; Supp.Rec. 186-219), the District Court failed to discuss it in its one sentence denial of 
the reconsideration request (Supp.Rec. 220). 
Ms. Hammer's description of pre-textual employment termination has been discussed in 
numerous Idaho cases, both in relation to IPPEA claims (Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire, 148 
Idaho 391, 395-397, 224 P.3d 458 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2008); Van v. Portneuf Medical Center, 147 
Idaho 552, 559-560, 212 P.3d 982 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2009)), and as the basis for various constitutional 
claims of terminated employees (Harkness v. City Of Burley, 110 Idaho 353, 715 P.2d 1283 (Id. 
Sup.Ct. 1986); Hatheway v. Univ. Ofldaho, 155 Idaho 255,310 P.3d 315 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2013)). 
Ms. Hammer should not be penalized for pleading elements required for a pretext 
employment termination claim, both under the IPPEA and in regards to other constitutional 
claims. Ms. Hammer prays that this Court reverse the District Court's judicial estoppel findings, 
ISSUE IV) Did the District Court err as a matter of law by finding that personal liability 
does not attach to Defendant Ribi or Defendant Briscoe under the IP PEA? 
On November 26, 2013, the District Court entered its Order dismissing Defendant Ribi 
and Defendant Briscoe (Rec. 567-575), finding that individual liability does not attach to 
municipal elected officials under the IPPEA. On February 18, 2014, the District Court denied 
Ms. Hammer's reconsideration request (Rec. 793-795). This Court interprets statutes de novo on 
appeal, State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 865-866 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2011). 
The entire IPPEA is made up of nine (9) sections (see Exhibit D herein). The purpose of 
the IPPEA is to prohibit retaiiation (i.e. adverse actions) against employees that report 
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government waste or misconduct. 
Idaho Statute 6-2103(5 )(c) is interesting in that it defines a municipal type of '·Public 
body" to include the individual "member or employee" of the entity (as it does for other various 
government types of units). But, the phrase "Public body" is not thereafter used anywhere in the 
IPPEA. It seems the Idaho Legislature intended to use the phrase "Public body" for some 
purpose. Ms. Hammer asserts that the Idaho Legislature intended to include the phrase "Public 
body" and all entities and individuals described as part of a "Public body", under the definition 
of "Employer" in Idaho Statute 6-2103(4)(a), to ensure these individuals and other types of 
government units would be subject to liability for violating the adverse action prohibitions of the 
IPPEA. The Court should note that during debate on the IPPEA, Rep. Berain, the sponsor of the 
IPPEA bill, made clear that the "heads of those agencies" would be subject to the IPPEA (Rec. 
233), indicating that there would be personal liability for any high ranking government official 
who retaliates against a government employee. 
But most significant is that, under Idaho Statute 6-2105(3), the employee must bring suit 
under the IPPEA "where the person against whom the civil complaint is filed resides ( emphasis 
added)", making clear that "persons", not just entities, would be sued under the IPPEA. 
As the Supplemental Release only named Sun Valley as a releasee, not any of its 
individual officials, the Supplemental Release cannot possibly have released either Defendant 
Briscoe or Defendant Ribi, individually, from claims under the IPPEA. 
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ISSUE V) Did the District Court err as a matter of law that Sun Valley, Investigator Ball 
and Attorney Naylor possessed attorney-client and work product privileges related to the 
Bail Investigation, and the Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report, which was released to the 
public? 
On January 17, 2014, the District Court entered its Order (Supp.Rec. 15-25) denying Ms. 
Hammer's Motion To Compel production of documents related to the Ball Investigation based 
on both work product and attorney client privileges, and on May 16, 2014 the District Court 
entered its Order (Rec. 809-818) denying reconsideration of those findings. The burden of 
showing that information is privileged, and exempt from discovery, is on the party asserting the 
privilege, Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Idaho 697, 704, 116 P.3d 27 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2005). This 
Court reviews the granting of both attorney-client and work product privileges de novo, U.S. v. 
Richey, 632 F.3d 559, 563-564 (U.S. App.9th 2011). 
Work Product Privilege Issues 
The work product privilege is based on I.R. C.P. 26(b )(3 ), which protects documents 
prepared "in anticipation of litigation or for trial". 
SA) Ball Investigation Communications Are Not Covered By Work Product Protections 
Because The Ball Investigation Was Not Commenced Primarily In Anticipation O(Litigation. 
In analyzing whether there is work product protections of an employee investigation, the 
test is whether, in light of the factual setting of the particular case, the investigator was retained 
because of the prospect of litigation, Diversified Industries v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 604 (U.S. 
App.81h 1978). In National Farmers v. City And County Of Denver, 718 P.2d 1044, 1047-1049 
(Col. Sup.Ct. 1986), in regards to an employee investigation, the Colorado Supreme Court 
described that the test is whether the "dominant purpose" of the employee investigation relates to 
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specific litigation. Work product protections are not granted to communications related to an 
investigation "If the same or essentially similar documents would have been created whether or 
not litigation was foreseen", Banks v. Office Of Senate, 236 F.R.D. 16, 19 (U.S. D.C. 2006). 
The Court should be clear as to the Ball Investigation chronology of events. First, Ms. 
Hammer was accused of misconduct. Second, the Ball Investigation was commenced. Third, Ms. 
Hammer was placed on administrative leave. Fourth, in response to the commencement of the 
Ball Investigation, and Ms. Hammer being placed on administrative leave, Ms. Hammer filed the 
Original IPPEA Law Suit. Fifth, and finally, Attorney Naylor was appointed by ICRMP to 
defend against the claims in the Original IPPEA Law Suit. It was the instigation of the Ball 
Investigation and that Ms. Hammer was placed on administrative leave which caused Ms. 
Hammer to take legal action - not the other way around. 
Former Mayor Willich's sworn-to testimony is that Investigator Ball was not retained to 
perform any work related to litigation, but solely to perform a "fact finding", "independent 
internal disciplinary investigation" to assist Former Mayor Willich in making a "decision 
whether to discipline" Ms. Hammer or not 125. The Sun Valley City Council simply authorized 
Former Mayor Willich to engage an investigator to conduct an "independent investigation" 126. 
Nowhere in those directions is there any indication that the "independent investigation" was 
commenced related to threatened litigation. And, Investigator Ball's retainer agreement (Rec. 
125 Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff.. Para. 9-13, Rec. 675-677; Willich Supp. Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para., 16, Rec. 540; 
Willich Compel Aff., Para. 17-23, 95, Rec. 298-299, 316; Willich Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 12, 14, Rec. 772-773. 
126 See Rec. 733. Former Mayor Willich is adamant that he was directed to hire an "investigator", not a lawyer, to 
perform the Ball Investigation (see Willich Dep., Rec. 1180-1185, Rec. 1203). Former Mayor Willich asserts that "I 
didn't hire an attorney I hired an independent investigator" (Willich Dep., Pg. 132, Line 3-4, Rec. l 203). 
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323-324) only describes that she was being retained to perform a "fact-finding investigation on 
behalf of Sun Valley", without any mention of litigation. 
In depositions, Sun Valley officials directly contradicted the Briscoe Administration's 
assertions to the District Court that Investigator Ball was retained because of threatened 
litigation. Former Mayor Willich confirmed that Investigator Ball was not hired because of 
litigation, but was hired to perform an "independent investigation" 127 . Former Council Member 
Lamb 128 and former Sun Valley City Council Member Robert Youngman129 ("Former Council 
Member Youngman") confirmed that Investigator Ball was not hired because of threatened 
litigation, but to perform a disciplinary investigation. Even Defendant Briscoe130 and Defendant 
Ribi 131 admitted that the Ball Investigation was not commenced because of threatened litigation. 
Attorney Naylor was not retained because of the commencement of the Ball Investigation 
- he was appointed by ICRMP solely because of the subsequent filing of the Original IPPEA 
Law Suit. Any discussion related to the Ball Investigation would have related solely to the 
misconduct allegations against Ms. Hammer. Therefore, such communications are not work 
product privileged, Koumoulis v. Independent Marketing Group, 29 F.Supp.3d 142,149 (U.S. 
E.D.N.Y 2014). 
The Ball Investigation was an internal disciplinary investigation commenced in the 
normal operation of Sun Valley's business, and would have been completed regardless of 
127 Willich Dep., Rec. 1180-1185, 1203, 1208. 
128 Lamb Dep., Rec. 1363, 1366. 
129 YoungmanDep.,Rec. 1325, 1336. 
130 Briscoe Dep .. Pg. 68, Line 21 Pg. 69, Line 4, Rec. 1235. 
131 Ribi Dep .• Pg. 86-88. Ribi Dep. Pg. 88, Line 2-6, Rec. 1288. 
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whether Ms. Hammer thereafter filed suit. The primary or dominant purpose of the Ball 
Investigation was not to respond to litigation, but solely to determine whether Ms. Hammer 
committed some sort of misconduct for which she could be disciplined. Nothing about the Ball 
Investigation is entitled to work product protection. The District Court's findings granting a 
global work product protection to all Ball Investigation communications was in error. 
Attorney-Client Privilege Issues 
The attorney-client privilege is based on I.R.E. 502(b) which states that communications 
which are made to or from an attorney "made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of 
professional legal services to the client" are protected from disclosure. The attorney-client 
privilege only protects communications specifically related to "securing a legal opinion", In Re: 
Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1355 (U.S. App.4th 1984). 
Whether An Attorney-Client Relationship Exists 
Before an attorney-client privilege is established, the attorney and the putative client 
actually must have entered into a valid attorney-client relationship. This Court has developed a 
two prong test for determining whether a valid attorney-client relationship exists. One prong 
includes looking at whether the client "subjectively" believed he/she had entered into an 
attorney-client relationship, Warner v. Stewart, 129 Idaho 588, 593, 930 P.2d 1030 (Id. Sup.Ct. 
1997) and Berry v. McFarland, 153 Idaho 5, 9, 278 P.3d 407 (Id. Sup.Ct. 2012). The other prong 
is whether both the client and the attorney had agreed by "clear consent" that they had entered 
into an attorney-client relationship (Warner v. Stewart@ 593; Berry v. McFarland@ 9). 
Normally, it is the attorney attempting to convince the Court that no attorney-client relationship 
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exists to avoid a malpractice claim (see Berry v. McFarland) or an ethics complaint (see Warner 
v. Stewart). However, in this case, it is the putative client (i.e. Former Mayor Willich) asserting 
that no attorney-client relationship existed during the Post Election Period, especially in regards 
to the Ball Investigation, to negate the Briscoe Administration's retroactive assertion that 
Attorney Naylor held some form of attorney-client relationship with the Willich Administration. 
In Muncey v. Children's Home, 84 Idaho 147,153,369 P.2d 586 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1962), in 
regards to attorney authority, this Court stated: "When a question of his authority is raised, as in 
this instant case, his actual authority must be established." 
SB) Attorney Naylor Was Reiected As Sun Valley's Appointed Counsel Because Of Conflicts 
Of Interest Between, a) Sun Valley And ICRMP, And, b) Sun Valley And Defendant Ribi. 
Attorney Naylor Was Thereafter Required To Withdraw From Any Representation Of Sun 
Valley. 
Former Mayor Willich held initial discussions with Attorney Naylor, but fairly quickly 
recognized that Attorney Naylor had a conflict of interest in representing both Sun Valley and 
Defendant Ribi in the Original IPPEA Law Suit 132. Former Mayor Willich demanded that 
ICMRP assign Sun Valley another attorney, but was told by ICRMP personnel and Attorney 
Naylor that he had no choice in the matter 133 . 
As to the conflict between Sun Valley and ICRMP, Former Mayor Willich readily 
admitted to Attorney Naylor that Defendant Ribi had harassed Ms. Hammer 134 and that 
Defendant Ribi was retaliating against Ms. Hammer by making misconduct allegations, 
132 Willich Compel Aff., Para. 61, 67, 73.78, Rec. 310-312; Willich Dep., Rec. 1181. 
133 Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 19-20. Rec. 678-679; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 36-37, Rec. 302-303; Willich 
Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 13, Rec. 773. 
134 Willich Compel Aff., Para. 77, Rec. 31 l. 
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including criminal misconduct allegations, against her135 . Those admissions by Former Mayor 
Willich on behalf of Sun Valley and the Willich Administration were in direct conflict with 
ICRMP's potential liability for substantial damages for Defendant Ribi's harassment and 
retaliatory conduct towards Ms. Hammer. When there is a conflict between an insured and an 
insurer, the insured is entitled to reject the insurer's appointed counsel and obtain independent 
counsel, San Diego Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc., 162 Cal.App.3d 358 (Cal. Sup.Ct. 
1988). Attorney Naylor had the duty to recognize the conflict between Sun Valley and ICRMP as 
to liability and damages in the Original IPPEA Law Suit, and had an obligation to withdraw from 
any further claims of representation of Sun Valley. Instead, Attorney Naylor took the position 
that he had an inherent right to act in any way he chose as ICRMP's appointed counsel. 
As to Defendant Ribi, as he was a member of the Sun Valley City Council, Former 
Mayor Willich recognized Attorney Naylor's right to defend Council Member Ribi against the 
Original IPPEA Law Suit, and his need to cooperate with Attorney Naylor. However, Former 
Mayor Willich also recognized the conflict between Sun Valley's defenses in the Original 
IPPEA Law Suit verses Defendant Ribi's personal defenses. The Willich Administration had the 
right to claim that Defendant Ribi individually, and not Sun Valley the entity, was responsible 
for the harassment and retaliation against Ms. Hammer, and had the right to demand that separate 
legal counsel be appointed to represent the divergent interests of Sun Valley as opposed to its co-
defendant Defendant Ribi, Murphy v. Urso, 88 Ill.2d 444 (Ill. Sup.Ct. 1981). 
The Court should recognize the conflict between Attorney Naylor's representation of 
135 Willich Compel Aff., Para. 70, Rec. 309-3 iO. 
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ICRMP's interests and Defendant Ribi's interests, verses Sun Valley's divergent interests. 
Former Mayor Willich had the right to demand separate counsel under those circumstances. The 
conflict also would prevent any potential claims of "common interest" privilege, because, as to 
the harassment claims of Ms. Hammer, Sun Valley and Defendant Ribi were not aligned. 
Attorney Naylor's failure to acknowledge his duty to withdraw as counsel to the Willich 
Administration vitiates any attorney-client client claims he may have otherwise asserted. 
Former Mayor Willich has confirmed, under oath, that he "subjectively" never 
considered Attorney Naylor to be his, or Sun Valley's, attorney during the Willich 
Administration (see Warner v. Stewart). And, both Attorney Naylor and Former Mayor Willich 
do not agree that any attorney-client relationship formed (see Berry v. McFarland). Thus, 
Attorney Naylor cannot be considered to have been Former Mayor Willich's or the Willich 
Administration's attorney for the purpose of any attorney-client protections during the Post 
Election Period, at all. Attorney Naylor has failed to bear his burden pursuant to Muncey v. 
Children's Home to prove his actual authority related to the Willich Administration. 
SC) Attorney Naylor Was Not Provided With Any Authority Related To The Ball Investigation, 
And Thus Cannot Claim Any Attorney-Client Privileges Related To The Ball Investigation. 
Even if this Court finds that Attorney Naylor had the right to force himself upon the 
Willich Administration as its attorney in the Original IPPEA Law Suit, Attorney Naylor had no 
right to assert a global, all-encompassing right to act as Sun Valley's legal counsel on all issues, 
and in particular in regards to the Ball Investigation. I.R.E. 502(a)(5) only provides attorney-
client protections to communications "made in the furtherance of the rendition of professional 
iegai services." Former Mayor Willich advised Attorney Naylor he was not to have anything to 
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do with the Ball Investigation, other than that he could read the report prepared by Investigator 
Ball when it was complete 136 . As Former Mayor Willich stated in his deposition: "Patti Ball was 
supposed to be doing my investigation, not Kirt Naylor's investigation. Because, remember, he's 
on the other team. Why would I want to get my independent investigation contaminated by this 
outside influence? Didn't want it."137 Former Mayor Willich re-affirmed this to Attorney Naylor 
at their December 16, 2011 meeting138 . The Sun Valley City Council also provided no authority 
to Attorney Naylor to provide any direction to Investigator Ball or to be involved in the Ball 
lnvestigation139. Therefore, because any communications between Attorney Naylor and 
Investigator Ball or Sun Valley personnel were not done pursuant to any professional services 
Attorney Naylor was authorized to perform related to the Ball Investigation, the District Court's 
findings that Attorney Naylor possessed any attorney-client privileges related to the Ball 
Investigation should be vacated. All communications related to the Ball Investigation, including 
those to or from Attorney Naylor, should be required to be produced. 
SD) Attorney Nay/or's Conduct Shows He Never Acted In A Manner Which Resulted In A 
Valid Attorney-Client Relationship With The Willich Administration. 
Pursuant to Idaho Statute 50-602: 
"The mayor ... shall be the chief administrative official of the city ... have the 
superintending control of all the officers and affairs of the city (emphasis added)." 
No Idaho statute provides the Sun Valley City Council or individual members of the Sun 
136 Willich Ribi/Donoval Aff., Para. 15, Rec. 677-678; Willich Compel Aff., Para. 26-27, 72, Rec. 299-300, 310; 
Willich Supp. Compel AfL Para. 13, Rec. 772-773; Willich Dep .. Rec. 1183. 
137 Willich Deposition, Pg. 51, Line 2 to Pg. 7; Rec. 1183. 
138 Willich Compel Aff., Para. 61-81, Rec. 307-313. 
139 Youngman Dep., Rec. 1328. 
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Valley City Council with any authority to direct any activities of Sun Valley or its employees or 
agents, including Attorney Naylor, absent the formal passing of a resolution or ordinance. And 
certainly no Idaho statute provides an insurance company appointed defense counsel with any 
unilateral authority to make any decisions on behalf of Sun Valley or conduct any affairs of Sun 
Valley absent explicit instructions from the Mayor of Sun Valley. Even if Attorney Naylor found 
Former Mayor Willich' s direction to not be in the best interest of his other clients Defendant Ribi 
and ICRMP, Attorney Naylor was still obligated, by Idaho statute, to report to and follow the 
directions of Former Mayor Willich during the Post Election Period. The Record On Appeal is 
replete with Attorney Naylor's failure to do so. 
The Court cannot minimize Attorney Naylor's failure to obtain a written retainer 
agreement during the Post Election Period defining his duties. Former Mayor Willich asserts that 
failure was done fraudulently so that Attorney Naylor could later assert that he had greater 
h . h h 'd d 140 h . 1 . . 141 B f 1· . 1 d aut onty t an e was ever prov1 e , as e 1s now c a1mmg . ecause o 1m1ts p ace upon 
Attorney Naylor by Former Mayor Willich due to the conflict between the Willich 
Administration's and Defendant Ribi's/ICRMP's strategy and scope of work, Attorney Naylor 
simply refused to put into writing what that limited scope of authority (if any) really was. Only 
later, with a new administration, did Attorney Naylor broaden his claim as to his authority. 
In addition, in violation of I.R.P. C. 1. 7(b )( 4 ), Attorney Naylor failed to obtain the written 
consent of both Sun Valley and Defendant Ribi to simultaneously represent both in the Original 
140 Willich Compel Affidavit, Para. 62; Rec. 308. 
141 Although Attorney Naylor did obtain a written retainer agreement with Briscoe Administration shortly after 
Defendant Briscoe was sworn in as the Nlayor of Sun Valley. (Rec. 452-455) 
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IPPEA Law Suit. 
Finally, Attorney Naylor's refusal to communicate with Former Mayor Willich related to 
the Original IPPEA Law Suit during the Post Election Period, violating I.R.P. C. 1.4 in the 
process, is the best indicator that Attorney Naylor himself believed he had no obligation to 
Former Mayor Willich or the Willich Administration, as opposed to ICRMP and Defendant Ribi. 
Attorney Naylor's conduct in contradicting almost all directions from Former Mayor Willich 
during the Post Election Period, negates any claims that he and Former Mayor Willich entered 
into a valid attorney-client relationship during the remainder of Willich Administration. 
Former Mayor Willich, who readily admits that 'Tm an engineer, not an attorney", 
needed the guidance of separate legal counsel he could trust and rely on 142 one who recognized 
the inherent conflicts between the directives of the still legally authorized Willich Administration 
verse the not yet legally authorized wishes of "Mayor-Elect" Defendant Briscoe (and presumably 
Defendant Ribi). Former Mayor Willich was entitled to an attorney who was loyal only to him. 
Instead, Attorney Naylor acted with disdain and belligerence towards his putative client Former 
Mayor Willich, violating several ethics codes in the process (i.e. I.R.P.C. J.2(a) (abiding by 
directions of client); I.R.P.C. 1.4 (communicating with client); and, I.R.C.P. 8.4(c) and (d) 
(misrepresentation and prejudicial conduct)). Attorney Naylor did not act like an attorney who 
had a legitimate attorney-client relationship with Former Mayor Willich, especially in regards to 
the Ball Investigation, and should not receive the benefits of that fictitious relationship. Former 
Mayor Willich had every right, under the circumstances, to reject Attorney Naylor as his, and the 
142 Former Mayor Willich goes as far as asserting that he was "manipulated" (Willich Dep., Pg. 49, Line 22 to Line 
25; Rec. 1182) and "hustled'' (Willich Dep., Pg. 73, Line 16 to 17; Rec. i 188) by Attorney Naylor. 
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Willich Administration's, attorney. 
As was stated in Muncey v. Children's Home, Attorney Naylor's authority "must be 
established, which has not been done." Attorney Naylor's own conduct during the Post Election 
Period, and his refusal to follow the directions or Former Mayor Willich, is the best indicator that 
no legitimate attorney client relationship ever formed between Former Mayor Willich or the 
Willich Administration and Attorney Naylor during the Post Election Period. 
SE) Attorney Naylor Assisted First Defendant Ribi, Then Defendant Briscoe And The Briscoe 
Administration, In Seeking A Retaliatory And Unwarranted Criminal Investigation Of Ms. 
Hammer. Thus, No Attorney-Client Privilege Exists Because Of The Crime Fraud Exception. 
Pursuant to I.R.E. 502(d)(l) any claims of attorney-client privilege are lost when "the 
attorney's services are sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit 
what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud." 
The Record On Appeal makes clear that Attorney Naylor became a participant, with 
Defendant Ribi and Defendant Briscoe, in seeking an unauthorized and unwarranted referral to 
the Blaine County Prosecutor seeking a criminal prosecution of Ms. Hammer, on behalf of 
ICRMP and Defendant Ribi, as a defense strategy against Ms. Hammer's civil claims. 
Former Mayor Willich confirmed that Attorney Naylor was seeking to find any excuse to 
assert that Ms. Hammer committed any criminal conduct as a defense against Ms. Hammer's 
legitimate harassment and retaliation claims against Defendant Ribi 143 . Attorney Naylor's 
motives were not legitimate, as Former Mayor Willich and the Sun Valley City Council had 
approved all of Ms. Hammer's actions which Attorney Naylor asserted were criminal. As a 
143 Willich Compel Aff., Para. 40, 47, 70, 77, 79; Rec. 303,305,310,311.312. 
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former prosecutor himself, Attorney Naylor should have known better. 
Attorney Naylor never received instructions from either Former Mayor Willich144 or the 
Sun Valley City Council 145 to seek a criminal investigation of Ms. Hammer. In fact, the Blaine 
County Prosecutor confirmed that Attorney Naylor had asked for a criminal prosecution of Ms. 
Hammer as ICRMP's attorne/46, not as Sun Valley's Attorney. Attorney Naylor also was the 
author of press releases and paid advertisements announcing that his client, the Briscoe 
Administration, was seeking that Ms. Hammer be criminally prosecuted 147 . Attorney Naylor 
crossed a line from simply giving legal advice, to actively participating in the retaliation against 
Ms. Hammer. 
The crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege provides that attorney-client 
protections are lost if the attorney's actions assist the client in perpetrating either a crime or a 
fraud, U.S. v. Gorski, 2015 WL 8285086, 6 (U.S. App.I st 2015). The fraudulent activity need not 
itself rise to the level of a crime, nor does the fraud or criminal conduct need to be completed, it 
merely needs to be "planned", In Re: Grand Jury Subpoena, 731 F.2d 1032, 1039 (U.S. App.2nd 
1984). As the U.S. 211d District Appellate Court stated in In Re: Grand Jury Subpoena @ 1039 
"The fraudulent nature of the objective need not be established definitively; there need only be 
presented a reasonable basis for believing that the objective was fraudulent." 
Ms. Hammer asserts that Defendant Ribi's, Defendant Briscoe's and Attorney Naylor's 
joint efforts in seeking an unwarranted criminal investigation of Ms. Hammer, for conduct that 
144 Willich Compel Aff., Para. 79, Rec. 312. 
145 Lamb Dep., Rec. 1371. 
146 See Blaine County Prosecutor letter of November 21, 2012 (Rec. 430-434 ). 
147 Rec. 961; Briscoe Dep., Pg. 144, Line 22 to Pg. 145, Line 24. Rec. 1254. 
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been approved by Defendant Ribi and Defendant Briscoe themselves, rose to the level of 
fraud as is contemplated by I.R.E. 502(d)(l )148, thus negating any claims that Attorney Naylor's 
conduct or communications were attorney-client protected. 
The Waiver Of Both Attorney-Client And Work Product Privileges 
Both the attorney-client privilege, In Re: Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (U.S. D.C.App. 
1982) and the work product privilege, U.S. v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239, 95 S.Ct. 2160 (U.S. 
Sup.Ct. 1975) can be waived by various acts of the litigants including by the disclosure of 
documents (In Re: Sealed Case @ 809). Once the privilege is waived, it is waived as to all 
communications relevant to the matter at issue, Skelton v. Spencer, 98 Idaho 417,421 565 P.2d 
1372 (Id. Sup.Ct. 1977); Weil v. Investment/Indicators, 647 F.2d 18, 24 (U.S. App.9th 1981). 
SF) Former Mayor Willick And The Briscoe Administration Have Waived Any Attorney-
Client Or Work Product Protections Related To The Ball Investigation By The Release And 
Publication Of The Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report, And The Substantial Disclosures 
Regarding The Ball Investigation In Affidavits And Depositions. 
Sun Valley and the Briscoe Administration have waived any attorney-client or work 
product protections they may have possessed in regards to the Ball Investigation in six (6) ways. 
First, the extensive disclosures by Former Mayor Willich of his relationship with, and 
conversations he held with, Attorney Naylor, especially his extensive disclosure of the December 
16, 2011 meeting Former Mayor Willich held with Attorney Naylor in his Affidavit In Support 
Of Motion To Compel (Rec. 293-316), waives any possible attorney-client privilege Former 
148 The criminal claims against Ms. Hammer by Attorney Naylor and Sun Valley officials were so frivolous that the 
Blaine County Prosecutor did not even present the claims of Attorney Naylor and Sun Valley officials to a grand 
jury (Rec. 430-434). Ms. Hammer asserts that Attorney Naylor, a former prosecutor. who improperly continued to 
act like one, should have known of the frivolous nature of the criminal allegations. 
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Mayor Willich or Sun Valley may have had with Attorney Naylor during the Post Election 
Period, and thus in regards to the entire Ball Investigation which occurred during that period. 
Second, the submission of communications related to a party opponent, to an outside 
third party, even to a government entity, waives both the attorney client and work product 
privileges as to that party opponent (see extensive discussion in Westinghouse Elec:. Corp. v. 
Republic Of Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1423-1431 (U.S. App.3d 1991), finding that 
Westinghouse waived attorney-client and work product privilege when it voluntarily released 
otherwise protected documents to government entities related to investigations). The waiver, 
waives any attorney-client privilege or work product privileges related to that matter, (In Re: 
Sealed Case @809). The Briscoe Administration's and Attorney Naylor's providing of the 
Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report to the Blaine County Prosecutor, waives any further attorney-
client or work product privileges that can be claimed by the Briscoe Administration or Attorney 
Naylor related to the Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report or the Ball Investigation. 
Third, the Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report was published in its entirety in the Idaho 
Mountain Express for approximately a year, and was extensively quoted in a Boise Weekly 
article of March 13, 2013 (which is still available on-line). The Briscoe Administration has 
inferred that the Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report was provided to the Idaho Mountain Express 
by the Blaine County Prosecutor. But, there is nothing in the Record On Appeal confirming that 
insinuation. Regardless of how the Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report was provided to the Idaho 
Mountain Express, and whether it was purposeful or inadvertent, the release and publication of 
the Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report waived any attorney-client or work product privilege that 
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have been associated with the Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report or the Ball Investigation. 
Fourth, during all of the depositions of the various Sun Valley officials during the 
summer of 2014, each official extensively discussed the Ball Investigation, and the parameters of 
discussions related to the Ball Investigation, the Original Ball/Naylor Report and the 
Unauthorized Ball/Naylor Report, which occurred during the eight (8) extensive, closed door 
Sun Valley City Council executive sessions between November 11, 2011 and January 19, 
2012 149. All of this was done while Attorney Naylor sat in the depositions as counsel to the 
various Sun Valley officials. The disclosure by the various Sun Valley officials of the substantial 
discussions related to the Ball Investigation during their depositions, waives any and all attorney-
client or work product protections that may have been associated with the Ball Investigation. 
Fifth, several Sun Valley officials, and in particular, Defendant Briscoe150, Defendant 
Ribi 151 , and Former Council Member Lamb 152 , asserted "advice of counsel" as reasons for why 
several decisions were made. The raising of "advice of counsel" as a factor in a matter, waives 
any attorney-client or work product protections that may have been asserted related to the 
matters at issue, In Re: Echostar Communications, 448 F.3d 1294, 1298-1299 (U.S. Fed.App. 
2006); U.S. v. Moazzeni, 906 F.Supp.2d 505, 512 (U.S. E.D.Virg. 2012). Therefore, the claim by 
149 Willich Dep., Rec. 1170-1216: Briscoe Dep., Rec. 1218-1264' Ribi Dep., Rec. 1266-1312: Youngman Dep., 
Rec .. 1314-1337; Suhadolnik Dep .• Rec. 1339-1354; Lamb Dep., Rec. 1356-1374. 
150 Ms. Hammer was terminated based on advice of Attorney Naylor and City Attorney King (Briscoe Dep .. Pg. 152-
153, Rec. 1256). Ms. Hammer was not provided a name clearing hearing based on advice of legal counsel Clayton 
Gill (Briscoe Dep., Pg. 165, Rec. 1259). Press Release announcing that Sun Valley was seeking a criminal 
investigation of Ms. Hammer prepared by Attorney Naylor (Briscoe Dep., Pg. 145, Rec. 1254). 
151 Legal advice provided to Sun Valley City Council that terminating Ms. Hammer "without cause" would negate 
having to disclose the real reasons for Ms. Hammer's termination (Ribi Dep., Pg. 91, Rec. 1289). 
152 City Attorney King was adamant that the Sun Valley City Council should terminate Ms. Hammer for misconduct 
(Lamb Dep., Pg. 15-17, Rec. 1360). 
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Valley officials that certain actions were taken by Defendant Ribi, Defendant Briscoe, Sun 
Valley or the Briscoe Administration on the "advice of counsel", waives any attorney-client or 
work product protections that may have been associated with the Ball Investigation. 
Sixth, the Briscoe Administration asserted in its Fourteenth Defense (Rec. 201) that Ms. 
Hammer committed "careless or criminal misconduct, thereby precluding recovery". As Sun 
Valley will be using the allegations of Ms. Hammer's misconduct, covered by the Ball 
Investigation, as a defense, all matters related to the Ball Investigation are subject to discovery, 
Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (U.S. E.D.Wash. 1975) - privilege is waived where the 
asserting party puts the protected information at issue by making it relevant to the case. 
Other Disclosure Issues 
SG) Any In Camera Documents Or Emails That Describe The Nature O(Services Provided Or 
Tasks To Be Performed By Attorney Naylor Or Investigator Ball Must Be Disclosed. 
In seeking to protect communications related to the Ball Investigation, the Briscoe 
Administration submitted two sets of in camera documents to the District Court (SV In Camera 
1-37; SV In Camera 38-64). They were presented to show that Attorney Naylor or Investigator 
Ball had some form of attorney-client relationship with Former Mayor Willich or Sun Valley. 
Ms. Hammer was not privy to those documents. Nor was Former Mayor Willich even allowed to 
review the in camera communications to certify their legitimacy or purpose. 
That an attorney-client relationship has arisen or the specific authorization for its creation 
are not privileged subjects, National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 384 
F.2d 316,318 (U.S. D.C.App. 1967) (citing Wigmore On Evidence). Communications 
describing the work performed by the attorney, or the purpose for the work, Clarke v. Anierican 
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Commerce National Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129 (U.S. App.9th 1992), or which relate to the "terms 
and conditions of an attorney's employment, the purpose for which an attorney has been 
engaged, the steps which an attorney took or intended to take in discharging his obligation" are 
simply not protected communications, In Re: LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595, 603 (U.S. 
N.D.Tex 1981); Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resources Corp., 801 P.2d 909,912 
(Utah Sup.Ct. 1990). The rule as to privileged communications does not exclude evidence as to 
the instructions or authority given by the client to his attorney to be acted upon by the latter, 
Henshall v. Coburn, 177 Cal. 50, 54, 169 P. 1014 (Cal. Sup.Ct. 1917), or the "steps'' or "acts or 
services" taken or to be taken by the attorney, Gold Standard v. American Barrick @ 912; In Re: 
Universal Service Fund Litigation, 232 F.R.D. 669, 675 (U.S. Kansas 2005). 
As the in camera documents were submitted to the District Court to show that an 
attorney-client relationship of some sort existed, what the parameters of that relationship were, 
and what the tasks were that were assigned to either Investigator Ball or Attorney Naylor, they 
are not entitled to attorney-client or work product protections, and thus, must be produced. 
SH) Any In Camera Communications Which Are Not Verified As Being Legitimate By 
Former Mayor Willich Cannot Be Considered To Establish The Privileges Claimed. 
Ms. Hammer is at an extreme disadvantage by not being allowed to review the in camera 
documents. Former Mayor Willich's Affidavit153 conforms that he may have never seen or sent 
many of the communications, or that they are otherwise not legitimate or credible. 
It is inconceivable that the District Court granted attorney-client or work product 
153 Ms. Hammer requests the Court to read the entire Willich Supp. Compel Aff. (Rec. 769-777) to understand the 
extent to which Former Mayor Willich denies he sought legal advice from Attorney Naylor, or admits to the giving 
or receiving of the communications submitted in camera or described in the Privilege Log. 
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privileges to all communications based on the in camera documents which one of the parties to 
the communications (i.e. Former Mayor Willich) refuses to verify as legitimate. Any of the 
unverified communications to or from Former Mayor Willich must be considered as hearsay, and 
thus rejected and not considered by the Court in determining whether any privilege exists. 
51) Any Unrequested Legal Advice Is Not Attorney-Client Protected. 
Ms. Hammer asserts that the Court must review each individual communication to 
determine whether it was legal advice that had been specifically sought by Former Mayor 
Willich. If the communication was not legal advice that had been specifically sought by Former 
Mayor Willich, the communication cannot be a protected communication. 
There are only eleven (11) email communications from Former Mayor Willich to either 
Attorney Naylor or Investigator Ball in the Privilege Log 154. If none of the communications 
specifically sought legal advice from Attorney Naylor, then advice Attorney Naylor may have 
volunteered to Former Mayor Willich (or Investigator Ball) is simply not attorney-client 
protected (see In Re: Grand Jury Proceedings, @ 1355). Attorney Naylor cannot justify the 
formation of an attorney-client relationship between himself and Former Mayor Willich by 
sending unsolicited, and un-responded to, legal advice to Former Mayor Willich. 
SJ) The Privilege Log Was Insufficient. 
When a litigant objects to the production of discovery, pursuant to I.R. C.P. 26(b )(5 )(A), 
the litigant must document what the communications or documents are that are being protected, 
and the reason for such protection, in what is generally described as a privilege log. In the 
154 Willich Supp. Compel Aff., Para. 7. Rec. 77 l. 
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Privilege Log (Rec. 502-517), the Briscoe Administration provided an extensive list of email 
communications related to the Ball Investigation it claimed required protection. The Privilege 
Log merely describes emails by date, who they are from and to, what type of protection is 
claimed (all of which are indicated as "Attorney Client Communication/Work Product"), and 
whether they were a "Factual Request" or "Investigation Administration". 
The labeling of emails as a "Factual Request", itself, requires the production of those 
emails, as facts are not protected by an attorney-client or work product protection, Upjohn Co. v. 
U.S., 101 S.Ct. 677, 685-686 (U.S. Sup.Ct. 1980). Even facts provided to an attorney by its 
experts in preparation for litigation are not privileged ( see I.R. C.P. 26(b )( 4 )(A )(3 )(ii)). And, as to 
the emails designated "Investigation Administration", the steps, acts or services to be performed 
or actually performed by an attorney or its agents are also not protected (as is described above). 
In order for the Privilege Log to be sufficient, it was required to have described the nature 
of each separate email such that Ms. Hammer could assess the privilege claim asserted, 
Executive Management Services v. F(fth Third Bank, 2015 WL 4758696, 8 (U.S. S.D. Ind. 2015), 
including a "general description of the subject matter" of the communication(@ 9). Conclusory 
assertions of privilege are insufficient to support a privilege claim, Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 
2015 WL 5111332, @3 (U.S. S.D.W.Virg. 2015). If the communication is claimed as attorney-
client protected, the privilege log must include a "clear showing" that the communication 
specifically involved the providing of legal advice, In Re: Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, 
501 F.Supp.2d 789, 797 (U.S. E.D.La. 2007). If the communication is claimed as work product 
protected, the description of the subject matter of the communication must include "competent 
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evidence" supporting any assertion that the communication specifically related to "the course of 
litigation or was in anticipation of a threat of adversarial litigation that was real and imminent" 
(In Re: Universal Service Fund Litigation @ 673). A party's conclusory assertion that a 
communication constitutes opinion work product is insufficient to establish that the 
communication is work product privileged, Koumoulis v. Ind. Fin. Mkt. @ 39. The failure to 
provide a sufficient privilege log results in a waiver of the privilege sought, Exec. Mgt. Svcs v. 
F~fth Third @9; Moe v. System Transport, Inc., 270 F.R.D. 613,623 (U.S. Mont. 2010). 
All entries in the Privilege Log fail to provide any description of the subject matter of the 
communication ( other than "Factual Request" or ''Investigation Administration"). If the 
communication is asserted to be attorney-client protected, there is no "clear showing" that it 
involved some form of legal advice. If the communication is asserted to be work product 
protected, it fails to provide the certification of how it was specifically related to imminent 
litigation. As the Privilege Log fails to comply with disclosure requirements, any and all 
privileges associated with the communications in the Privilege Log are waived. 
SK) The Global Exemption For All Communications Was Improper. Each Email And Other 
Communication Must Be Reviewed By The District Court Before A Privilege Is Allowed. 
The District Court's findings (Supp.Rec. 15-25; Rec. 809-818) gave all communications 
related to the Ball Investigation a global privilege, based both on attorney-client privilege and 
work product privileges, based on the in camera sample of documents. In U.S. v. Lawless, 709 
F.2d 485,487 (U.S. App.ih 1983) the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court Of Appeals stated: "The claim 
of privilege must be made on a question-by-question or document-by-document basis; a blanket 
claim of privilege is unacceptable. The scope of the privilege should be 'strictly confined within 
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the narrowest possible limits' "(citing Wigmore on Evidence). As burdensome as it may be, the 
District Court erred by not reviewing each email in the Privilege Log, even if it was in camera, 
to determine whether each email qualified for either the attorney-client or work product privilege 
asserted by the Briscoe Administration. Even within each email, the District Court was obligated 
to redact any portion of the email that deserves either attorney-client or work product protection, 
and require the disclosure of the rest of the email (see U.S. v. Christensen, 801 F.3d 970, 1008 
(U.S App.91h 2015) where the U.S Ninth Circuit Appellate Court stated: "If the nonprivileged 
portions of a communication are distinct and severable, and their disclosure would not 
effectively reveal the substance of the privileged legal portions, the court must designate which 
portions of the communication are protected and therefore may be excised or redacted prior to 
disclosure" ( citing Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege)). 
The District Court's global protection of all Ball Investigation related communications 
violated the District Court's obligation to review each email described in the Privilege Log to 
determine whether it actually qualified for either an attorney-client or work product privilege, 
and whether portions of emails that did not qualify for either privilege should be disclosed. 
ISSUE VI) Did the District Court err in entering costs against the Appellant? 
Because the District Court entered summary judgment against Ms. Hammer, on July 2, 
2015, the District Court also assessed $8,281.15 in costs against Ms. Hammer (Rec. 231). Should 
the Court reverse the District Court's findings and remand the matter(s) back to the District 
Court, Ms. Hammer requests that the Court also vacate the Order entering costs against Ms. 
Hammer and mandate that any costs already paid by Ms. Hammer to Sun Valley be rebated. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant Ribi and Defendant Briscoe both approved all of Ms. Hammer's actions and 
conduct as the Sun Valley City Administrator while members of the Sun Valley City Council, 
including in regards to her use of compensatory time and a Sun Valley auto. However, they acted 
as if, as members of the newly installed Briscoe Administration (as opposed to the Willich 
Administration), that they were "the government" and that their fraudulent criminal claims 
against Ms. Hammer were somehow legitimate, exempting them from any repercussions when 
their criminal claims against Ms. Hammer turned out to be false. Their conduct in terminating 
Ms. Hammer and seeking an unwarranted criminal investigation of Ms. Hammer was an 
extension of the on-going bullying and harassment Ms. Hammer suffered at Defendant Ribi's 
hands, and is primafacie evidence of the retaliatory conduct of both, which violated the "adverse 
action" provisions of the IPPEA. 
The mere mention of an investigation of a public employee, which includes ''criminal" 
allegations, is a death sentence to the employee's career, especially for a city administrator. 
Although exonerated of criminal allegations, the findings of the Blaine County Prosecutor did 
not help Ms. Hammer get her job back or make up for the extensive financial damages and 
emotional injuries she suffered at the hands of Defendant Ribi, Defendant Briscoe and Attorney 
Naylor. As Raymond Donovan said regarding an unwarranted investigation of his conduct as the 
U.S. Secretary Of Labor - "which office do I go to to get my reputation back?" The IPPEA was 
intended to right these types of retaliatory wrongs inflicted upon a public employee in Idaho. 
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As to the main issue on appeal, namely, the waiver issue, Attorney Naylor and the 
Briscoe Administration demanded that Ms. Hammer provide a release that waived "all claims" -
and paid her the "severance" even when she did not. Ms. Hammer's submission of the 
Supplemental Release, retaining the right to continue to bring certain claims she did not intend to 
waive when she signed the Employment Agreement in 2008 (including IPEA claims), even if the 
Briscoe Administration paid her the "severance", is certainly not the "clear and unequivocal act 
manifesting an intent to waive" that Justice Burdick described in Knipe Land v. Roberston (@ 
457-458). Attorney Naylor's and the Briscoe Administration's conduct in asserting that Ms. 
Hammer somehow released "all claims" anyway, is consistent with their conduct in also making 
false criminal claims against Ms. Hammer as part of their litigation defense strategy, requiring 
that Ms. Hammer spend the greater part of four ( 4) years litigating the matter. That conduct 
should not be condoned by the Court. Ms. Hammer prays that the Court vacate the District 
Court's summary judgment findings that she waived any right to bring claims under the IPPEA, 
and instead enter summary judgment in her favor that she preserved her right to bring claims 
under the IPPEA, even though the Briscoe Administration voluntarily chose to pay the 
"severance", and remand the matter back to the District Court with instructions reflecting such. 
Ms. Hammer also prays that the Court find that the post termination conduct of the 
Briscoe Administration is actionable under the IPPEA. Ms. Hammer prays that the Court vacate 
the judicial estoppel findings of the District Court. And, Ms. Hammer prays that the Court find 
that Defendant Ribi and Defendant Briscoe can be held personally liable under the IPPEA for 
taking adverse actions against Ms. Hammer. Ms. Hammer prays that the Court remand the matter 
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back to the District Court with directions related to all of the above. 
As to work product discovery issues, in depositions held after the District Court issued its 
findings that Ball Investigation related communications were protected by work product 
privileges, almost every Sun Valley elected official, including Defendant Ribi and Defendant 
Briscoe themselves, admitted that the Ball Investigation was, first and foremost, an internal 
disciplinary investigation related to the misconduct allegations against Ms. Hammer, and that the 
Ball Investigation was not commenced because of threatened litigation. Attorney Naylor was not 
even appointed by ICRMP until after the Ball Investigation was commenced and Ms. Hammer 
filed suit because of the commencement of the Ball Investigation and that she was placed on 
administrative leave. The Ball Investigation would have proceeded whether Ms. Hammer filed 
suit or not. That being the case, the District Court's findings that all Ball Investigation 
communications were work product protected was in error. 
As to attorney-client discovery issues, after his appointment by ICRMP, hand in hand 
with Defendant Ribi and Defendant Briscoe, Attorney Naylor aggressively and publicly made 
false criminal claims against Ms. Hammer as a litigation strategy to protect Defendant Ribi and 
ICRMP, in violation of I.R.P.C. 4.4(a)(4), and in direct violation of the directives of his other 
putative client Former Mayor Willich. Attorney Naylor became a co-conspirator in the retaliation 
against Ms. Hammer by Defendant Ribi, Defendant Briscoe and the Briscoe Administration, 
requiring the loss of any attorney-client privilege claims. In addition, because he was rejected by 
Former Mayor Willich as Sun Valley's appointed counsel because of conflicts, no attorney-client 
privileges related to Attorney Naylor during the Willich Administration should have been 
72 
APPELLANT"S AMENDED BRIEF 
granted. At a minimum, no attorney-client privileges should be granted related to the Ball 
Investigation, as Attorney Naylor was provided no authority related to the Ball Investigation. 
Ms. Hammer prays that the Court finds that Sun Valley and Attorney Naylor are not 
entitled to any of the work product or attorney-client privileges the District Court granted, 
especially in regards to the Ball Investigation, and remand the matter back to the District Court 
with directions to require the production of the documents and communications previously 
granted protection from disclosure. 
Finally, Ms. Hammer prays that the Court vac9te}he 
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THIS CITY ADMINIST.R.ATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT hen:%inafter 




W.clEREAS. Employer to employ 
Am:ninilrtrator City of SUll Valley (<°City"); 
WHEREAS, Employee to 
n,,. .. ,""'"'"'+-to the terms and conditions hereof 
NOW. THEREFORE. 
contair1ed. the above ,.'-"""'-'Id;!,'":, 
Employer hereby 
of Sun to perform the 
Employer, through the Mayor, 
thn,ron1a1t1v. competently with the llij;tlleSt 
expectEM:I ru:iministraror 'With Employee's bac:k:grc'.fun1d, 01llalt:1:Icsitioit1s 
2. 
A. Employee's Employment commence 1, 2008. Employee 
shall report to work no later than June 23, 2008, 
B.. Nothing in this Agreement prevent, limit or otherwise interfere 
with right of the Employer to termin&e the ""'"·"""~ of Employee under the applicable 
provisions of Section 3 below. 
C. Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent, limit or othe!Wise interfere 
with the right of the Employee to resign at any time from her position wtth Employer. subject 
only to the notice provision set forth in Section 3, Subsection c. of this Agreement. 
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.. CDON3 . ... . 
B. In the event Employee is terminated for "cause". then Employer shall 
not be obligated to make any severance payment to Employee. ••cause" is defined as (i) a 
material breach of this Agreen1ent; (ii) repeated neglect of Employee' s duties as City 
Administrator; or {iii) misconduct such as theft, dishonesty\\~ fraud, misrepresentation, 
embezzlement or other acts ofvvilifu1 1nisconduct. moral turpitude or criminal conduct. 
C. Unless the parties otherwise agree. if Employee voluntarily resigns her 
position with Employer, lhen Employee shall give Employer tbree (3) mon1hs notice in 
advance; provided Employer may waive such three month advance notice in its discretion. In 
the event of a voluntary resignation, Employee shall not be entitled to any severance payment 
unless the Mayor shall decide otherwise U1 his sole discretion. 
If Employee applies for employment elsewhere. and during the term of her 
employment hereunder is included in a list of ten or fewer candidates still under consideration 
for suoh employment. then. upon learning of her inclusion in such a list,. Employee shall 
promptly inform the Mayor and each member of the City Council, which shall be confidential 
insofar as is pennitted by applicable law. 
D. In the event Employee is tennfriated by Employer, acting through the 
Mayor, for any .reason. then Employer shall pay Employee, at the rate of compensation then 
being earned by Employee. all accrued and unused vacation entitlement in accordance with 
the then current policy for City Department Heads. 
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reauce:d by the .,_,,,,,,:.uu, 
02) months. If suffers any 1Jw4!.J.!Q.U<;;.t!L U.!.i><U.JUHV 
otherwise unable to perform her duties then sick leave, vacation, not:1ct8i1s 
time, benefits shall cease to accrue 
During the course of Employee's term of 
Employees~ System CPERSI''), 
Employee, accordance with Employer for 
Employer generaily. 
per month. 
SECTION 6. SICKLEAVE AND VACATION 
A. Upon commencement of employment, Employee shall have credited to 
her personal account forty ( 40) hours of leave and thereafter shall accrue sick leave at the 
same rate as City Department Heads employed by the City. 
B. The leave entitlement granted to Employee pursuant to Subsection A of 
this Section 6 shall be used by Employee for time attributable to recovery from an illness or 
injury only and not as additional vacation time. If such sick leave is not used, it shall continue 
CITY ADMINISTRATOR Elv.1:PLOYMEN"T AGREEMENT - 3 
6/14/2008 4:01 PM 
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such entitlement shall not accrue ,,c:;vuuu 
respect to the same vu,.u,,,,.u.,,au, 
entitled to be paid 
Upon com:mencement 
oerson,al account forty 
Employer shall reimburse Employee•s direct expenses relocating to 
the Wood River Valley, as substantiated by receipts. up to $15,000.00. 
INDEMN1FICATION 
Consistent with Idaho Code § 6~903, City agrees to indemnify and hold 
harmless Employee from claims. liabilities. or causes of action brought against Employee 
which related to the course and scope of Employee•s employment or which arise out of 
any act or omission within the course and scope of Employee's employnient~ provided, the 
City refuse defense or disavow to pay any judgment for Employee it is 
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was not course 
per·sona! service or as 
course of transmission in. the United 
A. The text herein shall constitute the entire agreement between ·the 
B. If any provision> or any no1ctton thereof. in this Agreement is held 
uru:mnstituti<Jnal. .u,,,,,:u,u or unenfurceabl~ the of this Agreement, or portion 
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payment of the severance payment required pursuant to Section 3.A. of the City Administrator 
Employment Agreement dated June 1, 2008, I release the City Of Sun Valley fur any claims defined in 
dministrator Employment Agreement as were intended when the City 









Administrator Contract http;//mail .aoLco~ 3 8~ 21 I/ao!-6/en-us/rnail/PrintMessage.aspx 
From: jdonoval <jdonovaf@aol.com> 
To: krrt <klrt@naylorhales.com> 
Su!,iec:t: Re: City Administrator Contract 
Date: Fri, Jan 13, 2012 10:14 am 
Kirt: 
000263 
If the City is going to terminate Sharon without cause her contract does not require her to waive any tort or any 
other non contract claims she may have with the City. So if the City is going to terminate her without cause, we 
should work on a separation agreement that has the correct waiver language in it, and get it over with. 
if the City is going to try to terminate her with cause, especially without any hearings or anything, you know that is 
going to face continued litigation regarding that issue alone. 
As to your other email, Sharon and I have given you several settlement offers that you have dismissed outright, 
especially during Mayor Willich's tenure, and I have asked on several occasions to sit with you and your client and 
you have refused - so we did not believe we were incorrect in filing the pleading. 
l would much rather have you provide me the settlement terms rather than the other way around, as thus far you 
have rejected anything we have put before you and have not countered. Please note that if you want a settlement of 
all matters, including any tort or IPPEA claims Sharon has, we are expecting that it also includes a dismissal of Mr. 
Ribi's and Ms. Rlbi's claims against me. And regardless of the language, we thought that dismissing the suit first 
was a good faith effort to settle the issues. 
Finally Kirt, there have been assertions all over the place of everyone doing bad acts. I am sorry for that. And you 
have probably not even been privy to some of the things that I have been subject to from Mr. Roark. However, the 
community here thinks this is a travesty and a waste of money and not what governments are supposed to be doing. 
However, if we are going to get to some resolution to this, it needs to give Sharon back her reputation. No one is 
going to win on every issue and we need to discuss the matters to get it resolved. I don't care if you record our 
conversations. But as much as we do not see eye to eye - we both need to get to some common ground otherwise 
this is going to go on forever. 
Best Regards 
JIM 
Please call me when you get this to start working on where we are going .. 
-----Original Message--
From: Kirtlan Naylor <l<ir.t@naylorhales.com> 
To: jdonoval <idonoval@aol.com> 
Sent Thu, Jan 12, 2012 7:32 pm 
Subject: RE: City Administrator Contract 
You may make any offer in writing to me. And I will communicate it to my clients. 
Kirt/an G. Naylor 
Direct 208 947-2070 
"' ~ .~.~~:~.!,:.~ <:~~.~,!;: ,.~:.~:~ 
Thi; email is a confidential communica1ion. 
1/18/2012 12:32 PM 
HAMMER 000263 
1036 
le: Resolution follow up 
--
From: jdonoval <jdoooval@aol.oom> 
To: kirt <kirt@~tes.com> 
.:im~,:c Re: Resolution follow up 
Date: Jan 2012 7:30 am 
Nils Ribi law suit is not an issue - I wm fight that myself. 
If the City Council teminates Sharon oo Thursday, we will be in Court immediately to see whether your theory of no 
,.,-.,,.~r.t extension flies. And regardless of whether you terminate her "without cause" - she has a property interest in 
her employment which we will 1111111ediateiy seek to enforce. And of course I wil immediately re-file the IPPEA claims. 
Is that you realty want - to oontim.ie litigation over this? 
JIM 
:lammer v. Sun http://mail.ao1.a 5138-211/aol-6/en-us/mail/PrintMessage.aspx 
ofl 
From: <jdonoval@aol.rorrP' 
To: kirt <kirt@naylorhales.com> 
"'1"',F"'i.; Hammer v. Sun \alley 
Dam: 2012 7:49 pm 
I assume that you are also cognitive of the fact that if you lose the argument that Sharon is not entitled to the six 
month severance that under 45--615 you may be subjecting the City Of SI.Ill \/alley to treble damages, and it 
may eventually cost SI.Ill \/alley about $200,000 in contract damages alone. 
JIM 
1/18/2012 12;36 PM 
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From: <jdoooval@aol.com> 
To: kirt <kirt@naylomales.com> 
Conversation 
20122:03pm 
J wiil foiward your offer to Ms. Hammer. 
http://mail.aol.co1 · 138,,,21 l/aol-6/en-m/mail/PdntMessage.asp: 
In the meanwhile, I am requesting that you retain the recording of today's oonversation as I bejieve that yoo 
mentioned that one, if not the only, reason that the City is contemplating termination action against Ms, Hammer is 
because she filed a !aw suit. As the only two actions are the IPPEA law suit {which she had a right to file and hes a 
right to re-file) and the Ht.man Rights complaint (which is stm pending), that evidence lends credence to the question 
of whether she is being terminated in retaliation for making valid claims against the City or Mr. Ribi. I do not want to 
"parse words" and therefore want to be sure of e:xacity what you said today in that oommrsation. Could yoo please 
provide me with a copy the transcript of today's telephone call. 
Best Regards and Thank You 
JIM DONOVAL 
1/18/2012 2:03 PM 
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Mr. Kirtlan Naylor 
950 W. Barmodc St., Suite 610 
Boise, iD 83702 
43125 None Condos; 
P0Box1499 
Sun Valley, ID 83353 
(lll) (2.08) 121~1383 
Re: Sharon R. Hammer Contract And Termination 
Dear Mr. Naylor: 
! want ro reiterate and adld to some of the 
diseussioll"!. 
that we mentioned in o!!Jr just completed 
First, should the City Of Sun Valley seek to terminate Ms. Hammer's contract without cause, and 
pay her the severance payment described therein, the language related to such states : "The severance 
payment herein is intended to be the Employee's sole exch.llsive remedy fur any and all claims of 
damages of any kind arising from a termination without cause and such severance payment is hereby 
agreed to be reasonable, fair and equitable by both parties to this Agreement. Accordingly, Employee 
waives her right to bring a claim of any kind for damages against arising from a termination 
without cause. Consequently, receipt of the severance payment is subject to execution of a release of all 
claims against the City Of Sun Valley." Please note that this language was drafted by then Sun Valley City 
Attorney Rand Peebles. As I have stated, the causes of action Ms. Hammer possesses for tort, indudlng 
the underlying harassment allegations against Council Member Ribi and several other claims, do not 
arise "from a termination", they arise out of separate incidents. Nor is it rational to assert that Ms. 
Hammer would have waived any non-contract damage claims she would have prospectively been 
entitied to {i.e. personal injury claims) when she signed the agreement. So as I have stated, if the City Of 
Sun Valley proposes to terminate Ms. Hammer without cause and pay her the severance payment in the 
contract, she will only a waiver that states the exact language in the contract cited above and 
nothing moreo 
i also want to r,;;;,rnm,n 
Wiiiich the Sun 
on at least two separate occasions 
Ms. Hammer has provided notice 
Bali and to Mayor 
Ms. Frostenson has 
c:ne,,l"?.,,l'i! her retirement aerount and that Ms. frost:enson has failed to accrue 120 hours of 
sab,!Jatiral vaarticm Ms. Hammer was entitled to (and was fur) in June of 2011 equaling $6,832. 
ensure that if the City Of Sun Valley terminates Ms. Hammer that those errors are corrected as 
part of Ms. Hammer's final termination payment. 
If the City Of Sun Valley terminates Ms. Hammer with aiuse, or asserts that the contract is 
invalid or expired, then of oourse she does not waive any daims of any sort, including in regards to the 
contract itself. 
Again, I want to remind you that should Ms. Hammer be required to litigate any matters related 
to Ms. Hammer's severance, then is the potential that she would be entitled to treble damages 
and attorneys fees for the 1..mpaid amounts pursuant to Idaho Statutes 45-615. Also, please oote that 
should Ms. Hammer be terminated, she is making demand for payment of all compensation due within 
forty eight hours (48) as is required by Idaho Statutes 45-606. 
v:~tYours~ 
1k,a,r ~lv';. v,ft 
Jd:~ 
Cc: S. Hammer 
z 
January 20, 2012 
City Of Sun Valley 
c/o City Clerk Kelly Ek 
Sun Valley City Hall 
Sun Valley, ID 83353 
SHARON .HAMMER 
Fnllfnilll!'aV Nine Cf:111fta~ 
1499 
Vallev. ID 83353 
(312) 985-0249 
sharonmammer@aol.com 
Sharon R. Hammer-48 Hour Severance Payment Demand Pursuant To fidah-~ Statute 45-606 
City Of Sun Valley: 
At approximately 5:30 p.m. on Thursday, Jam.sary 19, 2012, the Su111 Valley City Council, at the 
request of Mayor Dewayne Briscoe, terminated the existing City AdmiJi!lsti:ator Employment Agreement 
:; \,, ~ 
{the "'Agreement") between me and the Qty Sun Valley, pursuant to Sed:ion 3A of such Agreement 
Therefore, I am requesting payment of all wages and compensation due within 48 hours, or by 10:00 
a.m. Tuesday, January 24, 2012, as Is required by Idaho Statutes 45--606. 
Wages and compensation are as follows: 
a} Pursuant to Section 3A of the 11,;1:11«·-1'1fl!l:!>!M' I am demanding payment for six months 
compensation; 
b) I am demanding payment of four days of salary for the period of January 16, 2012 through 
January 19, 2012, the date of termination of the Agreement, or the equivalent of $1,858.88, at my 
current pay rate of $58.09 per hour; 
c) I am demanding payment of 188.88 hours of accrued vacation1 as is detailed on my payroll 
records, equaling $10,972.04, at my current pay rate of $5lt09 per hour; 
d) I am demanding payment for 40 hours of vacation time I was mandated to request the 
pay period ending December 18, 2011, because Mayor Wllllch instructed me to submit: a request fur 
vacation during the "administrative leave" period. The amount for this 40 hours equals $2,323.60 at my 
current pay rate of $58.09 per hour; 
OD 63 
e) I am payment for UO hem~ of sabbatical WC/Jltion time I earned in June 2011. The 
sabbatical time was never reflected in my vacation by Frostenson. On at least two separate 
occasions (to Patti to Mayor Willlch and the Sun Valley City Council), I have provided notice that 
Ms. shorted my vacation account by the 120 hours, my vacation accmal account has not 
been corrected. I am demanding payment of $6,907.80 for the UO hours of norracemed sabbatical 
vacation time ii'llt my rurrent pay me of $58.09 per hour; 
f) I am demanding payment for $1,642 that Ms. Frostenson shorted my !CMA-RC retirement 
account in January 2010 when the initial deposit was made. On at least two separate occasions ( to Patti 
Ball and to Mayor Wlllich and the Sun Valiey City Cmmdl), I have provided a detailed accounting of the 
amounts withheld from my pay not deposited into my ICMA-RC retirement account totaling $1,642. 
I have not been paid this shortage or been provided an explanation .iis to why the shortage occurred. I 
am demanding payment of the $1,642 retirement shortage. 
I am demanding that all funds described herein be made by direct deposit in my Chase 
{see attached void ched:) as been the practice of payment wages, 
by 10:00 a.m. Tuesday, January 2012. If such is not done, I consider the City Of Sun Valley to be in 
violation of the 48 hour payment requirement Idaho Statutes 45'"6-06. Should the City Of Sun Valley 
not make the payment demanded, or least full payment of any non-disputed balances due pursuant 
to Idaho Statutes then City Of Sun shall subject to payment for treble damages, 
attorney's and oost:s pursuant w ldaoo Statutes 45-615. Should the City Of Sun Valley dispute the 
oa1(mc,~s demanded0 I demand a written explanation for categof:V q(oompensation the Citv Of Sun 
Valley is disputing and a detail of the of the calculation of any undisputed bala1m:es actually paid. 
I am that in without any withholding for or any other 
employee related withholdings, ais the payments are a "lump sum.,_, related to the termination 
of the Agreement. Should any withholdings are specifically being done my 
authority or approval, and I consider those to also be done in violation of Statute 45-606. The City 
Of Sun Valley will have a unilateral determination of withholdings from my .:.i:.ri:;,,~~1r1,rs,li'I 
without my approval. I that e take responsibility for any and all taxes or employmef'llt related 
obligations assodated with the payments demanded. 
Finally, I have a Release Pursutmt To Administrator Employment Ai61w'i:>""1rn""1n1r 
which complies with the specific language of the Should the City Of Sun Valley to 
payment of the balances demanded by 10:00 a.m. Tuesday, January 24, 2012 due to any matters related 
to signing a release, I oonsider the City Sun to be in violation of Idaho Statutes c+;;;·'U'JQ. 
() {J 64 
City Administrator Employment Agreement dated June 1, 2008 between the City Of Sun Valley and 
Sharon R. prepared then Sun Valley City Attorney Rand Peebles, states as follows:, 
follows: 
"The severance payment herein is intended to be the Employee's sole exdusive remedy for any 
and all dalms of damages of any kind arising from a termination without cause and such 
severance payment is hereby agreed to be reasonable, fair equitable both parties to this 
Agreement. Accordingly, Employee waives her right to bring a claim of any kind for damages 
against Employer arising from a termination without cause." 
"I release all claims of damages of any kind! arising the termination of the City 
t ent by the City Of Sun Valley on January 19, 2011 and for any 




hlri,://mai I .aol .ccmlf 35478-2 I l /;10l-Mc11-us/mail/PrintMcssag,c.as 
HAMMER 000288 ~ 
From; Kirtlan Naylor <kirt@naylorhales.com> 
To: jctonoval <jdonoval@aol.com> 
;;:.mJ1ec:t: RE: Lump Sum payment 
Date: Fri, Jan 20, 201211:34 am 
••·--·----••·------·------W-••••-,,•,-----·--•·-·-----·--~-'>-----w----·-----------· 
That won't do. lf our accountants tell us this should be considered salary, the only way we will 1099 is if 
there is an indemnification by your client of all taxes and penalties (including the to the City), if the IRS 
deems it to be salary. 
Also, I just received the signed "release" and demand. 
The release language you propose is not adequate. It needs to be identical to the Agreement, which 
states: "Consequently, receipt of the severance payment is subject to execution of a release of all claims 
against the City of Sun Valley!' 
Please revise your release agreement to replace the last paragraph with this language, in order for 
payment to be made: 
"I release all claims against the City of Sun Valley," 





From: 1qp.119y.1i~•\1ql._<;().!D [m_;i1lto:)_d9n()v~1l1!:3J,19l.com] 
Sent: Friday, January 20, 2012 10:37 AM 
To: Kirtlan Naylor 
Subject: Re: Lump Sum payment 
As to her portion - yes. 
Sent from my Verizon Wireless BlackBerry 
From: Kirtlan Naylor <kir t1<1_)n_;,ylorh,1!,~s.rnm> 
Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2012 10:03:32 -0700 
To: jd0novat@i!.ol.CQ.ill<i.do0ovJl@ao!.c9m> 
Subject: RE: Lump Sum payment 
Will she sign an indemnification If there is deemed to be any tax liability for the City ifthis is deemed 
saf ary, requiring withholdings? 
Kirt/an G. Naylor 
Naylor & Hales, P.C. 
950 w. Bannock, Suite 610 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Direct 208 947-2070 
HAMMei'ia'oW2aa5 AM 
1488 
Add sentence the release, or we will not she has complied 
is no reason to delay this now. But the 44$$$" in hands. 
sum payment is the consideration fur the release. 
The other demanded wages deal with her termination. are not affected by this 
Please that In orderforthis to be paid direct City must with the 
no iaterthan the day before at 3:00pm. S01 I encourage you to send the signed revised release soon. 
Kirt/an G. Naylor 
Dm!!d: 208 947~2070 
NAYLOR&. HALES. P.C. 
'.!50W1:Sf !iAAOO!",UT, SI QTE 6 to llO!Sf, () 113102 
This email is a ~I oommimk:.11:im 
If It was sent ro \IOll mistli~ 




at4:03 "idonoval@aol.com" <idonoval@aol.com> wrote: 
48 treble and ~*"'""""-' 
Have a good weekend. 
Sent from my Verizon Wirakm B~ 
From: Kirtlan Naylor <kirt@naylorhales.com> 
Date: Sat, 21 Jan 2012 15:35:46 ..0700 
To: idoooval@ao!.com<jdonoval@aol. com> 
l:JUDMCI: Re: wnp Sum payment 




From: jdonoval@aoi.com [maiito:idonoyal@aol.comJ 
Sent: Saturday, January 21, 2012 3:34 PM 
To: Kh11an Naylor 
Subjed: Re: lump Sum n::in1,m.:>in;t 
thinking treble damages attorney fees. Read 
payments. She wiH sign your release on wednesday "'"u"""""'""'"'' 
wednesday. 
Sent from my Verizon Wireless BlackBeny 
From: Kirttan Naylor <kirt@nayiorhales.com> 
Sat, 2012 15:05:54 -0700 
To: jdonoval@aol.com<idonovai@aol.com> 
Subject: RE: lump Sum payment 
that sentence to the release, or we will not consider that 
There is no reason to delay this now. But hold the "'$$$"' 
sum payment is the consideration release. 
can't put limiting 
duress. Talk to you on 
The other demanded wages deal with her termination. They are not affected by this issue. 
2/10/2012 7:20 J 
From: Kirt.Ian Naylor <kil't@l~lomalel ... oc,m::,, 
To: Kirtlan Naylor <kll•navloml8lei~a:nn>; idonoval <Jl(IOrKMt~aoi.OOl'liP' 
..,..,.., ...... ;4,. RE: Sum payment 
Date: Sat, Jan 21, 2012 4:03 pm 
Attaehmemr. Release.pdf (421() 
Also, the limiting language is of the agreement she signed. So, when it says, "receipt of the 
severance payment is subject to execution of a release of all claims against the City of Sun Valley," in 
essence, the lump sum isn't due until that condition has been met. 
quoted the rest of the paragraph, it seems that to quote the rest Is exactly what should done. 
I have attached the acceptable release. If it is not received by 1:00pm Monday, payment wm not be 
able to be made by direct deposit. 





.. 4 .. 
- ,. 
RELEASE PURSUANT TO CITY ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
The City Administrator Employment Agreement dated June l, 2008 between the City of Sun 
Valley and Sharon Hammer, and as extended by the Extension dated September 17, 2009, 
states as follows: 
The severance payment herein is intended to be the Employee's sole exclusive 
remedy for any and all claims for damages of any kind arising from a termination 
without cause and such severance payment is hereby agreed to be reasonable, fair 
and equitable by both parties tot his Agreement Accordingly, Employee waives 
her right to bring a claim of any kind for damages against Employer arising from a 
termination without cause. Consequently, receipt of the severance payment is 
subject to execution of a release of all claims against the City of Sun Valley. 
Therefore, pursuant to the language of the City Administrator Employment Agreement, I state as 
follows: 
"I release an claims for damages of any kind arising from a termination wi1hout cause on January 
19, 2012, and all claims against the City of Sun Valley." 
Dated this __ of January, 2012. 
Sharon R. Hammer 




From: jdoooval <jdonovai@aol.com> 
To: mfrostenson <mfrostenson@sviadho.org> 
Cc: kirt <kirt@naylorhales.com> 
;;;:,u&»~11,;;i,; Revised Supplemental Release 
Date: Mon, Jan 23, 20121:48 pm 
http://mail.ao' u/35478-211/aol-6/en-us/maJ1/Pri..ntl\A...essage.as; 
Attachments: Revised_W4_001.tif {571 K), Suppleroontal_Release_001.tif (266K) 
Please see attached. Thank You. 
JIM OONOVAL 
~!0/2012 8:02 AM 
SUPPLEMENTAL RELEASE PURSUANT TO CITY ADMINISTRATOR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
payment of the severance payment required pursuant to Section 3.A. of the City Administrator 
Employment Agreement dated June 1, 2008, I release the City Of Sun Valley for any claims defined in 
ministrator Employment Agreement as were intended when the City 
nt Agreement was entered into on June 1, 2008. - ,wz_. 
'(7 l!T ?:,-,: 





Payroll Direct Deposit Voucher 
Sharon R Hammer 
PO Box 1499 
Sun Valley ID 83353 
Hammer, Sharon R ( 20011 } 
EARNINGS 
PERIOD 
TITLE HOURS RATE AMOUNT 
Regular 32.00 58.0900 i,858.88 
Overtime .00 .0000 
Vacation 348.88 58.0900 20,266.44 
Sick Pay .00 58.0900 
ON-CALL .00 .0000 
Misc Pay .00 .0000 60,412.13 
Comp Time .00 .0000 
Allow/Exp .00 .0000 
Deductible .00 .0000 
TOTAL GROSS 380.88 82,537.45 
TOTAL OED 15,601.92 -
NET PAY 66,935.53 
BENEFITS 
PERIOD Y-T-D 
TITLE AMOUNT AMOUNT 
Soc Sec 5,117.32 5,917.73 
Medicare 1,196.79 1,383.98 
PERS! Ret 193.14 1,208.91 
Health Ins 910.00 
Dental Ins 67.73 
Life Insur 
TOTAL BEN 7,505.95 10,648.03 








PAY PERIOD ENDING 01/29/2012 
DEDUCTIONS 












AMOUNT TITLE AMOUNT AMOUNT 
11,153.28 FICA 4,663.36 - 5,392.77 -
FWT 8,253.70 - 10,352.02 · 
22,590.04 SWT 2,476.11- 3,275.11 · 
Annuity 
32.00 PERSI Ret 115.81 • 724.88 • 
60,862.13 401K & Vol 
ICMARETIR 92.94 - 559.26 -
1,125.00 Cr Union 
Other Ins 84.30 • 
95,762.45 Flex Plans 230.76 • 
20,619.10- Misc Ded 
75,143.35 TOTAL DED 15,601.92 - 20,619.10-
BEGINNING ACCRUED USED REMAINING 
Vacation 188.88 .00 .00 188.88 
Sick leave 376.10 .00 .00 376.10 
Comp Time .00 .00 .00 .00 





This information Is being fumiShed to the Internal Revenue Service. Ii you 
~----~OM~B~No~.~1~~~~~~· , a negligence penally or other sanction ~ income is laXable and O!J fail to re rt It 
1:1 Employer idenlification number {E!N) 
82-0294056 
c Employer's name, address, and ZIP cooe 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY 
POB0X416 
SUN VALLEY ID 83353 
d Control number 
20011 
e Employee's name, address, and ZIP code 
SHARON R HAMMER 
PO BOX 1499 
SUN VALLEY ID 83353 
'I Wages, lips, other compensation 
94163.25 
3 Social security wages 
95447.39 
5 Macficare wages am;! tips 
95447.39 
7 Social security tips 
9 
11 Nonqualffied plans 
14 Other 
PERSI 724.88 
2 Federal income tax withheld 
10352.02 
4 Social security tax withheld 
4008.79 
6 Mecficare tax wilhheld 
1383.98 
8 Allocated lips 
1 o Dependent care benefits 
12a See Instructions for box 12 
i G 559.26 
12c 
C • . 
' 
15 Slate Employer's state ID number 16 State wages, lips, etc. 17 State income tax 18 Local wages, lips, etc. 19 Local income tax 20 Locality name 
ID j000059844-W 94163.25 3275.11 




Copy C-For EMPLOYEE'S RECORDS (See Notice to 
Employee on the back of Copy B.) 






ACTIONS IN PARTICULAR CASES 
CHAPTER 21 
PROTECTION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
6-2 0. LEGISLATIVE INTENT. The legislature finds, determines 
and declares that government constitutes a large proportion of the Idaho 
work force and that it is beneficial to the citizens of this state to 
protect the integrity of government by providing a legal cause of action 
for public employees who experience adverse action from their employer as a 
result of reporting waste and violations of a law, rule or regulation. 
History: 
[6-2101, added 1994, ch. 100, sec. 1, p. 227.] 
6-2102 SHORT TIT:':.,E. This act is known as '-""e f 
Public Employees Act." 
History: 
[6-2102, added !09~ 100, sec. 1, p. 227.] 
6-2103. DEFINITIONS. As used in this r: 
(1) "Adverse action" means to discharge, threaten or otherwise 
discriminate against an employee in any manner that affects the employee's 
employment, including compensation, terms, conditions, location, rights, 
immunities, promotions or privileges. 
(2) "Communicate" means a verbal or written report. 
( 3) "Employee" means a person who performs a service for wages or 
other remuneration. 
( 4) (a) "Employer" means the state of Idaho, or any political 
subdivision or governmental entity eligible to participate in the 
public employees retirement system, Idaho Code; 
(b) "Employer" includes an agent of an employer. 
(5) "Public body" means any of the following: 
(a) A state officer, employee, agency, department, division, bureau, 
board, commission, council, authority, educational institution or any 
other body in the executive branch of state government; 
(b) An agency, board, commission, council, institution member or 
employee of the legislative branch of state government; 
(c) A county, city, town, regional governing body, council, school 
district, special district, municipal corporation, other political 
subdivision, board, department, commission, council, agency or any 
member or employee of them; 
(d) Any other body that is created by state or local authority, or 
any member or employee of that body; 
( e) A law enforcement agency or any member or employee of a law 
enforcement agency; and 
(f) The judiciary and any member or employee of the judiciary. 
History: 




COURT ORDERS FOR VIOLATION OF CHAPTER. A court, 





(1) An injunction to restrain continued violation of the provisions 
of this act; 
(2) The reinstatement 
before the adverse action, or 
(3) The reinstatement of 
(4) The compensation for 
of the employee to the same position held 
to an equivalent position; 
( 5) The payment the 
full fringe benefits and seniori rights; 
lost wages, benefits and other remuneration; 
employer of reasonable costs and attorneys' 
fees; 
( 6) An assessment of a civil fine of not more than five hundred 
dollars ($500), which shall be submitted to the state treasurer for deposit 
in the general fund. 
History: 
[6-2106, added 1994, ch. 10 " 1 sec . .Lr . 228. 
6-2107. AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS TO EMPLOYER -- ACTION 
WITHOUT BASIS IN LAW OR FACT. A court may also order that reasonable 
attorneys' fees and court costs be awarded to an employer if the court 
determines that an action brought by an employee under this chapter is 
without basis in law or in fact. However, an employee shall not be assessed 
attorneys' fees under this section iC after exercising reasonable and 
diligent efforts after filing a suit, the employee files a voluntary 
dismissal concerning the employer, within a reasonable time after 
determining that the employer would not be liable for damages. 
History: 
[6-2107, added 1994, ch. 100,. se 1, ;::, 22':L 
6-2108. NO IMPAIRMENT OF EMPLOYEE RIGHTS UNDER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENT - CONFIDENTIALITY PROTECTED. This chapter shall not be construed 
to diminish or impair the rights of an employee under any collective 
bargaining agreement, nor to permit disclosures which would diminish or 
impair the rights of any person to the continued protection of 
confidentiality of communications where statute or common law provides such 
protection. 
History: 
[6-2108, added 1994, ch. 100, sec. 1, p. 229.] 
6-2109. NOTICE OF EMPLOYEE 
appropriate means to notify its 
obligation under this chapter. 
History: 
PROTECTirn\;. k1 empioyer shall 
employees of their protection 
[6-2109, added 1994, ch. 100, sec. 1 1 p. 229.] 
use 
and 
